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for the Masses
B y 0. PIATNITSKY

1.

The Presentation of

the Question

HE resolution of the Second Congress on the fundamental tasks of the Communist International (Part I,
paragraph 4) reads as follows :
"Only the Communist Party, if it really is the vanguard of the
revolutionary class, if it contains all the best representatives of that
class, if it consists of fully class conscious and devoted Communists,
educated and hardened by the experience of stubborn revolutionary
struggle, if this Party has managed to link itself inseparably with
the whole life of its class and through this class with the whole of
the masses of the exploited, and if it can imbue this class and these
masses with complete confidence-only such a Party is capable of
leading the proletariat in the most ruthless, determined and final
struggle against all the forces of capitalism.
"On the other hand, only under the leadership of such a Party
can the proletariat develop the whole might of its revolutionary
onslaught."

Have we in the capitalist countries, after fifteen years'
existence of the Comintern, such parties as fully satisfy all
the above-enumerated requirements ? The reply to this question must be in the negative. But although not a single
Communist Party in the capitalist countries completely satis-

fie the requirements laid down in the resobtian of the Second Congress, nevertheless, in a number of7couritries (China,
Germany, Poland), the Communist Parties have come close
to them during this period.
'Thesections of the Cornintern have a number of achieve'&* t i record and I will deal here only with a f& of
them.

11. The Achievements of the Communist Parties
The Communist International, unlike the Second International, and the Communist Parties, unlike the parties .affiliated to the Second International, during the fifteen years of
their existence have achieved considerable successes in regard to the proper presentation of the question of the struggle against imperialist wars and in the organization of this
struggle. As is well known, in 1914,'the Second International
collapsed shamefully, precisely during the war and in connection with the war.
Today, with the intensification of the antagonisms in the
camp of the imperialists, the post-war Second International
is again cracking up, and the fascization of its separate parthe
ties is being accelerated in the process'of transition to
*
second round of revolutions and wars.
During the fifteen years of its existence, the Comintern
has achieved absolute clarity, not only in the principles of the
question of the struggle against imperialist war, but also in
regard to the strategy and tactics of this struggle.
Various sections of the Communist International have
proved that in this difficult and important quesiion of war
they are striving to pursue, and in many cases are really
pursuing, the line of the cornintern, are fighting against the
stream of chauvinism, and are remaining true to the requirements of proletarian internationalism.
Let us take only a few examples.
a) The Communist Party of France during the Morocco
War.
In 1925, French imperialism waged war against Morocco.
At times the French suffered defeat. This called forth a
wave of chauvinism in France. The bourgeois parties, in-

c l d n g the Socialist Party, furiously c m far war against
Morocco and did all they c6uld to support this war. The
Communist Party alone waged a proper, O B Q # & ~ ~struggle
against this predatory war; and at meetings everywhere it
openly exposed the predatory, colonial policy of France,
fought for the independence of Morocco, and demanded the
withdrawal of the French troups from the colonies. It. goes
without saying that it is easier to adopt a defeatist position
in a colonial war, which openly bears a predatory character,
than in a war which the imperialists may claim to be a war
for the defense of the country against the attacks of the
powerful enemy. Nevertheless, the correct position taken
up by the Communist Party of France was an exemplary
one, the more. so that the Communist Party of France had
been formed comparatively recently out of the Socialist
Party, which during-the imperialist war was thoroughly infected with chauvinism. In 1 9 5 the Communist Party of
France passed its examination on the question of war.
b) There are still greater grounds for saying the same
thing in regard to the struggle waged by the Communist
Paity of China at the time the hordes of Chang Hsuehliang seized the Chinese Eastern Railway, and during the
Japanese invasion of Shanghai. What happened during the
seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway? I t is well known
that not only the Chinese militarists, the Kuomintang, etc.,
but also the parties of the Second International in all the
capitalist countries, in order to discredit the U.S.S.R., falsely
depicted the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the
Chinese militarists, who were backed by the imperialists, as
a war against unequal treaties. The Northern militarists
were also supported by the Trotskyists, Chen-Tu-hsuh and
others. The Chinese Communists did not allow themselves
to be influenced by this demagogy. In its propaganda, agita-

tion, and in the yhole of its practical work, the Communist
Party of China pursued the Leninist line and -fought against
the Kuornintang and the militarists in its own country.
During the invasion of Shanghai by the Japanese imperialists, the Communist Party of China succeeded in taking
the lead in a mighty, anti-imperialist mass movement against
the Japanese invaders, and it organized resistance to Japanese imperialism while continuing the struggle against the
Kuomintang.
And what about the glorious, heroic story of the Red
Army in China ? After the treachery of Chiang Kai-Shek,
who was supported by international imperialism, and the
victory of the Kuomintang counter-revolution, a small group
of armed men led by Communists fought its way out of the
ring of enemies, retreated to the hills, began to rally around
itself new forces, fortify itself in the territory it occupied,
and gradually enlarged its territory.
Enlisting to its side the broad masses of the peasantry in
- the fight against the imperialists, the militarists and the landlords, gradually arming itself with t& weapons it captured
from the enemy, repelling the superior forces of the Kuomintang counter-revolution and of the imperialists with. exceptional heroism, it managed to build up a Red Army which
today is a big factor in the. international revolution.
Having set up a Soviet government, and having proved
to the workers and peasants of China, and of the whole
colonial East, that it is possible to fight victoriously against
the imperialists and landlord reaction, the Communist Party
of China not only strengthened its positions among the broad
masses in the Soviet regions, but also disintegrated the rear
of the enemy. Thanks to this, the Red Army, led by the
Chinese Communists, repelled all the five Kuomintang campaigns against it, and emerged from each campaign stronger

than it had been before. It is now heroically repelling the
sixth campaign, instheorganization of which the biggest imperialist powkrs are taking part. The ~ e Army
d
is improving the fighting qualities of its units, and is paralyzing the
monstrous military machine which Chiang Kai-shek has built
for the purpose of eradicating Communism from China.
The successes the Communist Paxty of China has achieved
in the midst of war and revolution should serve as an ex
ample to all other Communist Parties, particularly at
present time when we have come right up to a new round
revolutions and wars, when the application of the Leninist
line in war and revolution becomes the central task of every
section of the K;ornmunist International.
c) Finally, the Communist Party of Japan.
In Japan, where the whole bourgeoisie, the whole press
and all the parties are shouting that, without Manchuria and
expansion on the continent of Asia, Japan will suffocate,
where the Social-Democratic parties speak with exceptional
cynicism about the civilizing role of *Japan in Asia, where
day after day it is dinned into the minds of the masses that
Japan is invincible since she has never suffered defeat in
--it
has been particularly difficult for the small Communist Party ta raise the question of the defeat of the fatherland and the transformation of the imperialist war into civil
-war. Nevertheless, it did this. It boldly and determinedly
went against the stream. . It not only put forward correct
slogans, but carries them right among the masses, penetrates
everywhere where there are workers and peasants, and comes
out in opposition to the war and in defense of China.
The examples quoted give us grounds for saying that the
question of the fight against war has been properly put in
these sections of the Communist International. By this I do
not want to suggest that all the Communist Parties have in

A

the past period properly agitated against war, sufficiently
mobilized the masses for the purpose of combating it, and
in particular, have done all that is necessary to prevent
the shipment of munitions to Japan and to defend the Chinese Revolution. Only after all these weaknesses have been
overcome, when mass work, concerning which I shall speak
later, has been properly organized, will the sections oP the
Communist International be able at the decisive moment to
fight properly against war and for transforming the imperialist war into civil war.
d) The revolutionary workers and the bourgeoisie of all
countries know now that the Communist Pa* alone champions the interests of the working class and it alone is capable of organizing it for the struggle against the bourgeoisie.
That is why the bourgeoisie is driving the Communist Party
underground.
e) The Communist Parties are pursuing the uniform line
of the Communist Intemational. The Communist International is united by the Executive Committee of the Cornintern into a single, world, centralized party, which the Second
International never had and never will have.
f ) The Communist Parties are inonolithic parties and not
a "bloc of trends." In these parties there are neither factions
nor groups as there are in 'the Second International. The
Communist Parties are waging a tireless and successful struggle on two fronts; against opportunism and against "Left"
sectarianism.
g) And what about our cadres? Our cadres display selfsacrifice in the struggle. This applies to the legal Parties
in the w - d e d democratic countries, and there this is of
great significance, because the times have passed when it was
possible to demonstrate or strike without being arrested or
shot; but this applies particularly to the illegal parties.

In Bulgaria, Poland, Japan, China and other countries,
where every Communist who falls in@ the hands of the
class enemy is beaten up, subjected to torture, is sentenced
to long terms of severe imprisonment, the majority of the
Communists do not cease to be Communists, and do. not
. cease their struggle even in prison. On leaving prison, the
majority of them immediately take up their work again.
Or take Germany. Even in China and Japan, where
Chiang Kai-shek and the Arakis know how to torture and
exterminate revolutionary workers, we have not witnessed
such torture and cruelty and such a mass extermination of
captured revolutionary workers as we have witnessed in
Germany. In 'fascist Germany on various pretexts, after
trial and without trial, everyone who is suspected of belonging to the ranks of the Communist Party is tortured and
killed. The dead are silent. . But there is already a literature
based on the statements of those who have managed to escape from the concentration camps after unprecedented torments. These unprecedentedly cruel and refined tortures of
'
the fascist executioners are intended physically to exterminate or break the spirit of the Communists. Has it succeeded? Those Party workers who have escaped from the
camps display indomitable readiness to take up their work
again immediately.
We have Party workers with whom we y n go through
fire and water. What*then is it that is so often lacking?
They are not always able to carry on systematic, practical,
mass work properly.

III. The Spheres in Which the Communists
Have Not Fulfilled Their Tasks
In passing now to what in my opinion is an important
question, I must utter a warning. Naturally, I shall speak
principally about defects and mistakes. That does not mean,
however, that our sections have not achieved positive successes in this work during the past year.
But in the first place, the comrades who spoke before me
dealt mainly with their achievements and, in all probability,
those who speak after me will also do the same. (Laughter.)
Secondly, it is necessary to analyze the mistakes that are being committed in order that they shall not be repeated. Moreover, attention must be concentrated on defects in order to
learn the lessons they teach and achieve greater successes
than those which the sections of the Communist International have achieved in the period between the Twelfth and
Thirteenth Plenums.
What have the Communist Parties and the revolutionary
trade unions failed to carry out in regard to what is required
in the present situation? Again and ag$in it must be emphasized that the Communist Parties, the Red trade unions
and the revolutionary trade union opposition have not yet
learned to carry on mass work well, to agitate and to consolidate the influence they acquire in their everyday work.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Socialist parties and the
reformist trade unions in all countries are taking part in the
growing political and economic offensive against the working class (the fascization of the state apparatus and the a g
plication of fascist methods of violence, the continued sharp
reduction of nominal and real wages, the furious increase in
the intensification of labor, the cutting down of d l f o m s
of unemployment relief and the line taken for the complete

abolition of unemployment insurance, compulsory labor,
etc.), the Communist Parties a d tho r c v o l ~ t k ytrade
u~ionrhave twt sclfficiently lliberoted thea m s e s of the

workers from the influence of the Socid-Democratic parties
and of the trade unwn bureaucrats.
The number of workers and unemployed who are disillusioned with the policy of the reformists is increasing, and
this is due to no small degree to the work of the Communist
Parties and of the revolutionary trade unions. But the workers who left the Social-Democratic parties and the reformist
trade unions have not, in the mass, come over to the Communist Parties; they either joined the fascists (Germany,
Cz&Slovakia,
Austria), or the Consematives and Nat i 4 Laborites (England during the last election), or else
remained outside of all parties. Moreover, the Communist
Parties, the revolutionary trade unions and the unemployed
organizations have not managed to enlist and retain in their
ranks the masses of the workers who follow their lead
(Germany,before Hitler came to power ;England and America, during the big unemployed movements and strikes).
At the same time another dangerous phenomenon is observed; undsr the h f 2 w n c e ~
of adzra~hgfascism, the approach of ca# a d the sharp wors&ng of their conditions,
the masses of the workers in the so-cdled democratic couk
trk4 ar o remit of the f d t y work of the Commicnist Partie$# the rsordutiowy trade u&ns and the revolurionwy
mas wgu&ations, are crgain throwing h m s e l v e s into the
~ nofsthg s o c ~ f a c c i s ~Thus,
.
during the municipal elections in England, the Labor Party gained 292 seats at the
expense of the Conservatives and the National Laborites.,
In the parliamentary elections in Norway, the Labor Party
obtained 69 seats. In the cantonal elections in Geneva, the
Social-Democratic Party obtained q6 per cent of the total

number of votes -cast; and yet in French Switzerland the
workers, in the beginning 68 this year, engaged in massbattles during which Communists were killed. The workers are
also joining the reactiokry trade unions (the American
Federation of Labor increased its membership by 500,ooo).
At a time when the world situation is approaching right
up to the second round of revolutions and wars, it is particularly important for the Communist Parties to understand
why their influence on the broad masses of the workers is
weak, and why considerable numbers of workers still follow the Social-Democratic parties and the reformist trade
unions. I shall try, by comparing the situation in several
Social-Democratic parties and Communist Parties, and also
by comparing the work of the reformist trade unions with
that of the Red trade unions in the same industries, to indicate some of the reasons why the Communist Parties and
the revolutionary trade unions are lagging behind.
A. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE S0C;IALIST PARTY
OF FRANCE

A ~ e wFigures
*
on the Commma'st Party and the
Sodist Pwty
I shall quote a few figures on the membership of the
Communist Party and the Socialist Party of ~ r a & e(according to the official returns of these parties) :
Members
Socklist Party Communist Party
Year
1920 (at the time of the split) 179,800
......
1921 (after the split) ........
50450
110,000
I931 ...................... 130,900
29415
1932 ...................... 13'7,700
32The fluctuation of membership from 1924 to 1932:The
Socialist Party of France made 292,700 new members and
I.

lost 186,415 members. Hence, 106,285 members remained.
In the same period the Communist Party lost more members
than it made.

\

Take the central organs of the respective parties: Le
Popukrire and Y H u ~ n i t e At
. the time of the split in 1920,
the average circulation of YHumanite was 140,000 per day;
in 1ga7 the average circulation reached 172,000 per day.
L'Humnite has hardly any regular subscribers. In I ~ W ,
Le Pop~laire had an average of 18,236 subscribers and
29,700 daily street sales. In 1932, the average number of
subscribers rose to 43,000 and daily street sales to 75,000.
In the same year the average daily circulation of Z'H~manite
dropped to 113,068. The sales of Z'Humonite are dropping,
the sales of Le Popwhire are rising. The average daily sales
of Y H u w i t e in Paris were: in 1gz1-f7,ooo, in 19845,000, in 1932 ( fourth quarter)-z7,2gg.
Now take the parliamentary elections. In 1928 the Socialists obtained 1,698,084 votes ; the Communists obtained
I ,063,gCj3 votes. In 1932 the Socialists obtained I ,964,084
votes and the Communists-795,630 votes.
2.

The Unitary a ~ Reformist
d
Trade Unions

We now come to the trade unions, and we get the following figures: In 1923 the unitary trade unions* had a membership of 39.1.137 members; in 1926 they had 464,836
If we take
members and in 1933 (on August I)-m,o88.
the four federations separately, the builders, textile workers, metallists and miners, we get the following: in ~ g q ,
these had a total membership of 1 ~ , 8 o 0 ,and in 1g3a the

*

The unions A i a t e d to the revolutionary Unitary Confederation of
Labor as distinct from the ref ormist Confederation of Labor.-Ed.

;

membership was -77,100. We lost 107,700 members during
this period. Of the unitary trade unions, only the railwaymen's and civil servants' unions are more or less stable ;they
lost only 3,000 members in this period. On the other hand,
at the time of the split in the trade union movement in
France, the reformist unions had about 400,000 members,
now, according to what the reformist leaders say, and they
are no doubt exaggerating, they have about 800,0oo, that
is to say they have doubled their membership.
This growth of the Socialist Party and of the reformist
trade unions is taking place amidst the general worsening of
the conditions of the working class in France and the direct
participation of the Socialists and the trade union bureaucrats in the government's offensive against the standard of
living of the workers. It is sufficient to quote a few figures
showing the drop in wages and the cuts in unemployed relief
to become convinced that even in France, where this year a
relatively steady increase in output in certain,branches of
industry has been observed, wages and the number of worke r s employed have continued to decline.
a ) In the metallurgical works in Rombas wages have
dropped 280 to 350 francs per month, compared with 1931,
and in the works at Knutange they have .dropped 300 to
400 francs per months. Wages in the textile industry have
dropped 15 to 20 per cent. Simultaneously with the wage
cuts, bonuses have t+n abolished, family allowances have
been reduced, machines have to be cleaned without pay after
working hours, and an extensive system of fines has been
introduced, etc., etc.
b) In normal times, the total number of workers employed
in industry, according to the figures of the Unitary Confederation of Labor, is 7,500,000. On October I, 1933, the number of totally unemployed was 1,282,000 and the number of

partially unemployed was 2,820,000. The percentage of the
per cent unemvarious industries is as follows : miner-o
ployed, metal workers-30. I per cent, chemical workers21.5 per cent, etc.
c) Unemployed relief is paid to 232,880 unemployed
workers, at an average of 10 francs per day.
How is it to be explained that, in spite of their treacherous
policy, the Socialist Party and the reformist trade unions are
growing, whereas the Communist Party of France .and the
unitary trade unions, which fight for the interests of .the.
working class, are losing members, losing votes and losing
readers of their press? It can only be explained by the fact
that the Communist Party of France and the unitary trade
unions are working badly, and above all, badly carry on mass
work. Let us examine a few concrete examples.
The treachery of - the Socialists and the leaders of the
Confederation of Zabor. When the Sick Insurance Bill was
being passed' through the French Chamber, the Socialists
and the leaders of the reformist trade unions voted in favor
of compelling the workers to pay contributions. The first
time these contributions were deducted from wages, I 50,000
workers spontaneously stopped work and demanded : "Give
us' O& ten sous." The Socialists and the Confederation of
Labor sabotaged this strike.
It was the sodalists and the trade union leaders who
drafted the clause in the Bill to cut dawn state and administrative expenditure, which saved the government 320,000,oa, francs at the .expense of the salaries of civil servants.
They voted in favor of reducing the budget by ~OO,OOO,OOO
francs, by reducing bonuses and subsidies to civil servants
and workers. They voted for the budget that included expenditure on armaments,. expenditure on the colonies, expenditure on the police, on the secret setvice, etc.

.

The Socialists and the trade union bureaucrats systematically betrayed strikes. Thus, in the summer of 1931, they
betrayed a big strike of textile workers in the North, in
which 125,000workers were involved, and they concluded an
agreement with the employers which provided for a reduction of wages. In 1933, they betrayed a strike of m,ooo
workers in Strassburg.
It is well known that the leaders of the reformist trade
unions openly take part in the work of the state institutions.
of the bourgeoisie. Thus, Jouhaux and other secretaries of
the Confederation of Labor, are members of the Supreme
National Economic Council, an organ of the government;
they are members of the organs of the League of Nations,
etc. The Socialists and the trade union bureaucrats ;tctually
take paxt in the work of fascizing the state apparatus and in
the preparations for imperialist war. These facts provide
the Communist Party and the revolutionary trade unions
with numerous opportunities for exposing the leaders of the
Socialist Party and of the Confederation of Labor ;but full
advantage is not taken of these opportunities.
In the North of France, in the very district where,. as I
have said, the reformists betrayed the textile strike,' the
number of trade union dues stamps issued between July I,
1931, and June 30, 1933, has not diminished in comparison
with the period 1927-29, and the reformist trade union social
insurance society, Le Travd, even increased its membership
during these two years by 20,000. And it must be borne
in mind that the bulk of the workers in the North of France
&e textile workers.
Could such a position have arisen had the Communist
Party and the Unitary Confederation of Labor exposed to
the broad masses of the workers the strike-breaking tactics
of the reformists during the textile strike and the other

treacherous acts of the Socialist Party and, of the reformist
trade union bureaucrats ?
I shall give you a concrete example of faulty work on
the part of the Unitary Metal Workers' Union in Lyons.
Before the economic crisis, about 20,000 metal workers were
employed in Lyons. In 1p8 the Unitary Metal Workers'
Union had a membership of I ,500, and had contacts with a
considerable number of factories. During the past years,
however, it lost these contacts, because it did not carry on
any systematic' work and did not even fight against wage
cuts. The mutual Aid Fund organized by the unitary trade
union was G t u r e d by the Trotskyists. The trade union also
had an unemployed relief fund, but it was allowed to fall to
pieces, and has not beea restored during the crisis. The
same thing happened to its legal advice bureau.
In I@, while the reformists were concluding a collective
agreement with the employers, the unitary trade union developed a campaign exposing and explaining the policy of the
reformists. Now, however, the agreement concluded by the
reformists with the employers is not known to the workers,
and it is not exposed by the unitary trade union. Many
cases of wage cuts have occurred, but the trade union waged
no campaign against that. As a result of this deterioration
in the work, the membership of the trade union has declined
from 1,500 to 300. The rebrmists, however, who had
hardly any influence before, now have a stronger trade union
than ours, with 400 members.
This is not the only example of the work of the unitary
trade unions.
What is the position of the revolutionary trade union opposition in the Confederation of Labor? Although the
unitary trade unions achieved certain successes and enlarged
their contacts with the reformist and unorganized workers
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by means of demonstrations, meetings, etc., they did not
carry on any systematic work inside the reformist trade
unions, and are not doing so now. In the campaigns connected with the preparations for the congresses of the Confederation of Labor and the Unitary G n f ederation of
Labor, we criticized the activity of the former, but neither
the revolutionary trade union opposition groups nor our
sympathizers in the Confederation of Labor unions expressed such criticism. The result oP this weakness in the
work of the revolutionary trade union oppositions was
that not a single real delegation from the reformist trade
unions attended the congress of the Unitary Confederation
of Labor. And yet an opposition does exist in the Confederation of Labor (opposition speeches at the latter's congress, the withdrawal of moral support from the Conf ederation of Labor by the reformist Gas Workers' Union in
Landes, the expulsion of several opposition branches of trade
unions from the Confederation, for example, the Builders'
Union in Dijon, several miners' delegates, etc.). But neither
the Communist Party of *Francenor the unitary trade unions
have any connection with this opposition. This shows that
no work is yet being carried on in the reformist trade unions
either by the unitary trade unions or by the Communist
Party of France.
But even in those cases where the unitary trade unions
enjoy considerable influence they are unable to consolidate
this influence by organizing their sympathizers. Take for
example, the Unitary Miners' Union in Calais. ~ h a n k sto
an improvement in its mass work, this union achieved considerable successes recently, about which I shall speak in
greater detail later. We are interested now in another aspect
of this work, viz., the continued weakness in the consolidation ,of our influence in the pits. In pit No. 3 in Kurner,

the unitary trade union .put up a candidate for the position
of miners' agent who received IOI votes, and he was elected.
In this pit there are only four members of the Unitary Miners' Union. In the Labourse pit, the &didate of the unitary
trade union for the position of minus' agent was elected by
a vote of 32%but the union has only six members in that pit.
In St. Angoil, the unitary trade union has only ten members,
and yet its candidate was elected by a vote of 471. The reformist candidate obtained 60 votes, although the reformist trade union has 50 members. The results of the
$ d o n s leave no doubt that the unitary trade union has
c o n + d d l e influence in these pits, but it is unable to recruit
ot retain new members. The growth of the iduence of the
trade anion is not acc-panied
by the growth of its organization and by its organizational consolidation.
And-yet the position is such that all that is required is that
the unitary trade union should exert a little effort for the
work to produce good organizational results. The work
of the members of the unitary trade union among the clothing workers of Lyons goes to prove this. The reformist
'Clothing Workers' Union, which is very strong in Lyons,
agreed to a 30 per cent wage reduction on the pretext that
prices had dropped. The unitary trade union, in spite of its
weakness (only one member of this union put up a real
&$at)# with the aid of the district council of the Unitary
Uattting Workers' Union, called d n g s and distributed .
Iwfkts, and thus roused all the workers, men and women.
When the wage cut was declared, the indignation among the was so strong that at a number oP factories the
maehiges were stopped. The employers, fearing a strike
throughout the whole clothing industry, were compelled to
withdraw the wage cut. As a result of this victory, the
Unitary Clothing Workers' Union became much stronger,
.
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and four trade union branches were formed in the factories.
The influence of the refotmists considembly declined.
& I have already stated, ,the Unitary Miners' Union in
Calais recently achieved cbiderable. successes. The number of branches has increased as compared with 1932. In
twelve branches, 329 new members were made, and in eight
branches, I 17 members were 'lost. This success can be
ascribed to. the improvement in the methods of work; for
example, the union began to publish a monthly paper, The
M i d s Voice. When they started this paper they had not a
sou, but the sales of the first issue (6,300 copies were published) brought in sufficient funds for publishing the seamd
issue (7,000copies), and at the present time the paper is
being run without a loss. In addition to 'the publication of
this paper, mention must also be made of the good work
carried on by various branches and individual members,
which has produced definite results. Take for example the
branch in pit NO.3 in Lievin. This branch was formed in
I 93I, and consisted of zo members ; in the middle OF 1933
it had 240 members. This result was achieved by the regular
calling of meetings, the discussion of the tasks ahead, the
enlisting of all the members in trade union work, the proper
distribution of functions, etc. There can be no doubt that
the proper organization of' mass work by the other &tary
trade unions. would produce the same positive results. Hence,
it is up to the Communists aod the revolutionary trade union
workers.
'

3. The Demagogy and Maneuvers of the ~ o c i a l k t ; and
Trods UtlMn Bweawritts, and the Mistakes of the
Communist Party a d the Unitary Confedemtwn of Lobw of Frame

The united front. The Central Committee of the Com-

munist Party of France committed serious opportunist errors at the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 in carrying out the united front. For three months the leading
body of the French Communist Party carried on negotiations
with the Socialist Party concerning the terms of a debate
that was to be organized on the question of unity generally.
Accepting one after another the terms demanded by the
Socialist Party, including "the mutual obligation to abstain
from accusations and insults," and "equal number of invitation tickets," etc., they eventually came to an agreement
that the :'meetings must bear the character of mutual respect and discipline."
The mistake the Political Bureau of the Central Cornmittee of the Communist Party of *France made was not
of course that it carried on negotiations with the Central
Committee of the Socialist Party, although it is difficult
to understand why they should qegotiate with P.U.P.'ists,*
with renegades and people who have been expelled horn the
Communist Party, who represent nobody. Their mistake
was that they failed to carry on negotiations for the organization of a united front of struggle between the Communist
and Socialist workers on definite
and on a definite
program ;instead they discussed the organization sf a debate
on questions concerning the united front. These negotiations
were carried on in the following manner: the Communist
Party called a meeting on the united front, to which they
invited the Socialist leaders. That was the proper thing to
do. That meeting was very successful; but owing to the
opening of negotiations, no further meetings of this kind

*

Partie dd'Un&e&oletar&.
Party of Proletarian Unity-a small
group of opportunists who were expelled from the Communist Party
in 1929.-Ed.

were called. Had the Communist Party continued to call
such meetings on the united front then, in view of the interest displayed by the workers in a united front of struggle,
the success o l the Communist Party of France would have
been assured, as is proved by the anti-war campaign which
the Party carried on in a skillful manner. This campaign
met with a very fine response not only among the nonoparty
workers, but also among the members of the Socialist Party
(122branches of the Socialist Party a i a t e d to the Amsterdam anti-war movement).
The Socialist Party, which began by intimidating its m a bers who took part in the anti-war movement, had to change
its tactics, because threats of expulsion had no effect. It
commenced negotiations with the Communists not for the organization of a united front of joint struggle-of course
the Socialist Party does not want such a united front-but
about the terms of organizing a debate on the united front.
Its purpose was to put a stop to the process of disintegra:
tion in its ranks. And thanks to the mistakes committed
by the Central Committee of' the Communist Party of
France, the Socialist Party succeeded in its object.
Then began a series of joint conferences, communiques,
etc., about trifling matters. And this created the illusion
among the Socialist workers that real unity was beink discussed. The interest displayed by the workers in these negotiations was enormous. Outside the hall where these
negotiations were going on hundreds of workers gathered.
Having started these negotiations, the representatives of the
Communist Party should have tried to transform them into
negotiations for a real uoited front of struggle on a definite
platform and in this way expose the representatives of the
Socialist Party,because the latter's aim, of course, was something entirely different. The members of the Socialist Party

'

who were disappointed with their party were already on the
road to the Communist Party. But owing to the fact that
the latter had entered into these negotiations for "unity"
with the Socialist Party, they thought to themselves: well,
the Socialist Parti is not so bad after ill, why should we
leave it? Perhaps the two parties will unite.
These negotiations for the organization of a debate on
the "scientific" significance of the unity of the working class
were brought to an end only by the intervention of the
E.CC.1. As is well known, in the beginning of March, the
Central Committee of the Socialist Party rejected the pro@ of the Communist Party of France to establish a united
fknt of struggle on a definite platform, and left no doubt
whatever that these negotiations for a debate wen simply a
maneuver on its part. As far as I know, the Communist
Party called no further meetings far a united front after the
e
cessation of the negotiations.
-The campaign for the united front was not carried on any
better by the unitary trade unions. Take, for example, the
tactics of the Unitary Confederation of Labor on the question of organizing a united front of struggle of the municipal workers and office employees against the sweeping attack
upon.their wages that the government was preparing. As a
result of the pressure of the masses, on November 30, 1932,
the reformist unions in Paris called a big meeting of municipal employees to protest against the proposed wage cuts. But,
scarad by the call made to its members by the unitary trade
unions to attend this meeting, the reformists cancelled itt
Thus, the unitary union had every opportunity of taking the
initiative and calling a meeting themselves to atpose the
reformists and utilize the meeting for the purpose of organizing a united front oP struggle with the municipal employees
against the attack on their standard of living.

But instead of doing this the unitary union came to an
agreement with the reformists to set up a joint committee
to convene the meeting, to have an eqrcd number of speakem,
and to refrain from all verbal criticism. And this was agreed
to in spite of the fact that the unitary unions in Paris have
appronimately three times as much influence upon the municipal employees as the reformists, And Z'Humunite wrote
that the meeting passed off in fraternal unity and that the
( 4 pact of non-aggression was very conscientiously observed
by the unitarians." It is not surprising therefore that Le
Popddre wrote that the meeting was one of the best examples of the application of the tactics of the united front.
(Loughte*.) Apparently, 4'Humanite accepted this praise at
its face value.
The Unitary Municipal Employees' Union in Dijon went
even further in its capitulation to the reformists in carrying
out the united front. In Wjon, the initiative in calling a
meeting of the municipal employees against the government's
attack on their wages was taken by the reformist union. Here
too, the unitary union called upon its members to attend the
meeting. When the reformist leaders, seeing the temper of
the meeting, proposed that a joint bureau be set up, and began
to make "Left" speeches, o w Comrade Haniman declared
that he was "glad to note the change of position of the reformist organizations and the speakers who have adopted
the point of view of exposing the anti-working class character of bourgeois parliamentarism and of 'Left' governments, which they formerly supported." (Cahiers du Bod
c h e v k e , December I, 1932, p. 1458.)
And yet, the treacherous policy of the leaders of the Confederation of Labor and OF the Socialist Party could have
been very strikingly exposed to the masses on the question
of their attitude to the reduction of the deficit in the budget

,

at .the expense of the municipal employees. In the course of
the year during which the Finance Bill was discussed in the
Chamber, Jouhaux and his supporters pretended to be
opposed to the Bill, carried on mysterioqs negotiaiions with
Boncour and proposed amendments to the Bill which. in
fact, also provided for economies at the expense of the
workers and o&e employees amounting to three quarters
of a billion francs. As a result of d l this. the government's
Bill was passed, and 38,000 municipal employees were dismissed, no new employees were engaged, wage and salary
cuts.were introduced ranging from 2 to 10per cent, various
bonilpes to workers and office employees were reduced by
a0 per cent, etc.
Tks Commwaist Party of France and the Berlirr Protocol.
But since the Communist Party of France displayed such
faith. in the proposals of the leaders of the Socialist .Party
to negotiate the terms of a debate on the united front, and
since the leaders of the unitary trade unions got so enthusiastic about the loud-mouthed "Left" phrases of the reformists, it is not surprising that the Communist Party and
the unitary trade unions were so helpless in exposing the
furious campaign and .the demagogy which the Socialists
and reformists developed in connection with the prolongation of the Berlin agreement between the U.S.S.R. and
Germany.
Fulfilling the direct orders of French imperialism, Rosenfeld began to pretend that he was a loyal friend of the
German proletarian revolution and of the German Communists. Le Popdaire of May 11 commenced a campaign
against the U.S.S.R. in connection with the signing of the
Berlin Protocol and hypocritically exclaimed : "The Bolshevik Party is persecuted in Germany as the ~ e r m a nsec-

tion of the Communist International, which has its headquarters in Moscow. It is persecuted for displaying the
Soviet emblem. . . . And this is the very moment the Soviets
choose to sign.a pact of amity with Hitler. The workers'
and peasants' government of Russia binds itself with a
friendly protocol to the executioners of the German workers." In the same issue of Le Populaire Leon Blum engages in the same demagogy but addresses himself directly
to the Communist Party of France. He wrote : "How can
they" (the French Communists) "explain to the masses of
the workers the fact that, while their brother party in Germany has been driven underground by the fascists and while
their leaders are threatened with death at the hands of Hitler
and Goering, the Soviet government hastens to sign with
fascism . . . a pact of confidence and amity."
Replying to these articles in Le Populuire, I'Humanite,
in its issue of May 22, writes : 66. . . . I t would do no harm
to revert to the question of the ratification of the protocol
prolonging the German-Soviet treaty concluded in 1926. .
The treaty in question was concluded in Berlin on April a+,
1926. . . This is a typical treaty of non-aggression, such as
the Soviet Union concludes, and such as was concluded, for
example, by the Soviets with France. I t was prolonged in
Moscow on June 24, 1931, but Germany had not yet exchanged ratifications of the prolongation of the treaty' .with
the U.S.S.R. . . . Hitler did this himself without preliminary
~iegotiationswith the Soviet government. Thus, to the great
confusion of the falsificators, Blum and Rosenfeld, it was
Hitler, and not Stalin, who ratified the treaty of 19g631.. . 99
And that is all. In reply to this "argument," Rosenfeld
. wrote another article in Le Populuire of May 23, in which
he said: ". . . Let us admit for a moment that this is trut.

..
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. . . ~ u tin' that case. how can one explain the comments of
'

Imartk a d Pravda which welcomed this ratification as an
themselves on it. No, l'Humanite must think 06 some other argument to pacify its readers who are becoming increasingly
."
disturbed about it.
'
To this artide of Rosenfeld, Z'Humanite made no reply
whatever.
One must give credit to the French Socialists for their
ability to maneuver and to develop demagogical agitation;
whereas the French Communists do not always opportunely
and ably expose these maneuvers and this demagogy.
Le Popukrire, Rosenfeld, Blum & Co., as well as the whole
of the Second .International, were confronted with the task
of counteracting-by means of sickly sentimental phrases
about the persecution to which the German Communists are
being subjected "for displaying the Soviet emblem''-the
stunning effect that the treachery of the German SocialDemocratic Party and of the Geman trade unions, before
and when Hitler came to power, had upon the French workers, and in fact, upon all workers. To some extent, the Socialists were able to fulfil this task because the oral and
written agitation of the Communist Party of France and of
the unitary trade unions failed to refute in a sufficiently intelligible and clear manner the despicable attacks against the
U.S.S.R. More than that, this agitation did not even expose
the French Sqcialists and the Socialists of other countries,
who either themselves have shot down workers and peasants
in their own countries and particularly in the colonies,, or
have supported the bourgeois governments in suppressing
the toilers, Did not the French Sodalists vote money, and
are they not now voting money, to the French government
for the sanguinary suppression of the people in Morocco,
act of international significance, and congratulated
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.

Syria and Indo-China, who are rising against the yoke of
, are so "inPiench imperialism ? Did not Blurn & G.who
dignant" about the Berlin protocol, support the French government when it signed the Four-Power Pact to which fascist Germany belongs? .Did the French Socialists ever protest against the fact that their government is in alliance with
the Polish, Rumanian and Jugoslav fascist governments
which are shooting down starving workers and peasants,
and who are torturing and physically destroying political
prisoners in their dungeons? Attention should have been
called to these and other facts of the treacherous practice
of the French Socialists.
The French proletarians, whom the Blurns try to fool with
sentimental phrases, should have been reminded of the policy
of tears and blood pursued in the interests of their bourgeoisie, and against the toilers now and in the past by the
parties of the Second International when in power. Did not
the "Labor" government of MacDonald ruthlessly shoot
down the workers and peasants of India and of other colonies who rose against the intolerable yoke of the predatory
imperialists? Did it not destroy whole villages with fire and
sword ? Did not the Social-Democratic police presidents of
Berlin and Altona shoot down workers' demonstrations, particularly the May First. demonstration in Berlin in '193,
andrthe demonstration in Altona in July, 1932? Did not the
fascists execute Comrade' Luetgens and three other Communist workers who were arrested at this Altona demonstration by the Social-Democratic police president because
of their anti-fascist work?
The French Communists must tirelessly and persistently
remind the workers of the whole truth about the treachery
of the social-fascists. This would suppress all desire on the
part of the French Socialists to try to hound the toilers
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against the u.s.s.R.'by means of campaigns of slander; and
it would help the broad masses of the workers to understand
the real motives of these campaigns.
. Now a few words about. the Berlin Protocol.
Should the U.S.S.R., which is the o n l ~
country as yet in
which the proletarian revolution ' has- conquered, and which
is, in the words of Lenin. "as yet an oasis amidst a seething
sea of imperialist piracy" (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.
XX'III, "Speech in ~ 6 r e i ~Policy,"
n
May 14, 1g18), reject
'.the possibility of temporary agreements with capitalist states
in the sphere of industry and commerce, and, if it is possible,
in the sphere of diplomatic relations ? Should the U.S.S.R.
take advantage of thd discord among the imperialist states
in order to hinder their coming to an agreement against the
first, and so far, the only land of the proletarian dictatorship,
or as far as possible to make such agreement temporarily
impossible? No honest worker can have the slightest doubt
that it is the bounden duty of the Soviet Union to take advantage of these antagonisms to strengthen the Soviet Union.
Such agreemehis, said Comrade Stalin, in his "Interview
with the First American Delegation," "are possible and expidient in conditions of peaceful development . . The limits
to the& agreements? The limits are set by the opposite characters of two systems between which there is rivalry and
conflict. Within the limits permitted by these two s y s p s ,
but only within those limits, agreement is quite possi61e."
(Stdin, L e d ~ k Vol
, I.)
. It is true, there were so-called "revolutionaries" in 1918
who urged that the land of the proletarian dictaforship
should not enter into any agreement with capitalist states.
As is well known, their point of view was rejected ;the adoption of this point of view w d d merely have helped the imperialists and their accomplices, the Social-Democrats of all

.
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countries, who would have shouted that the Sovet Union
itself was to blame, because it isolated itself from the whole
world; it would have helped them in their further pursuit of
the policy of blockade and intervention against the Soviets.
Indeed, in the very first days of its existence, the Soviet government appealed to the people and governments of all countries to stop the war and establish normal diplomatic and
trade relations with the land of the proletarian dictatorship.
Life has fully confirmed the correctness of these tactics from
the standpoint of consolidating the Soviet state and developing the international proletarian revolution. Perhaps, in entering into such agreements with capitalist states, the
U.S.S.R. should have been guided by the form of the bourgeois dictatorship"democratic" or fascist--existing in the
respective countries, and should establish normal diplomatic
and trade relations with "democratic" France; iay, and break
off the relations with Germany, because she became a fascist
state; or should refuse to conclude agreements with China,
Janan, etc., because the bourgeoisie and landlords in these
countries oppress and exploit the workers and peasants by
feudal and fascist methods? The broad masses of the workers will have no doubts in their minds on this question if the
Communists prove to them by facts that "democratic" England or France employ the same methods of colonial enslavement of the peoples of India or Indo-China as the Japanese
employ in China, Korea or Formosa; that in all the capitalist
countries, irrespective of their form of government, the predztory exploitation of the workers is growing, the ruination
of the bulk of the peasantry is increasing. and the peasants
are being driven from the land because of their failure to
pay their debts. This. of course. does not mean that it is a
matter of indifference to the Communists, from the point of
view of mobilizing the forces of the proletariat and of de:

veloping the revolutionary struggle, whether the "democratic" or the fascist form of dictatorship exists in the &en
capitalist country. But this is not what we mean when we
speak of the establishment of relations between the proletarian state and the capitalist world. From the point of view
of these relations, all capitalist countries are alike. All these
countries are governed by the bourgeoisie, which, according
to the prevailing circumstances, exercises its dictatorship
.either in the form of ''democracy," or in the f o m of fascism.
But the social-scoundrels shout : 'The Soviet government
3 concluding pacts of non-aggression with capitalist states,
including fascist states ! It gives a hearty welcome to statesmen fnnn the capitalist countries l
." The best reply to
sneh, and similar, demagogic outcries by the social-fascists
did renegades is to explain to the workers the principles underlying the foreign policy of the Soviet -government:
a)' The ~ & e tgovernment does not intend to attack other
c~untries,for it is, in principle, irreconcilably opposed to the
enslavement of one state by another, of one nation by
another.
b) The Soviet Union rejects and fights against imperialist
war, which is waged in the interests oP a handful of capitalists and causes the physical extermination of millions of
workers and peasants.
, c) .For the first time in the history of humanity two
worlds, two systems, two irreconcilable types of state, conf r ~ none
t another.
In tke old capitalist world there is economic decay and
&hPsF, t
k growth of parasitism, the growth of exploitstion. :sf ~ n & ~ l o ~ m e nruin.
t . poverty, starvation and the
despair of the toilers.
In &e'Sovigt Union. in the land of victorious socialism,
fiere is a rate of development of productive forces unpre-
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edented in history. a gigantic growth of industrialization
and the victor); of the collective farm system, the ZQuidah
of classes and of the causes which give r S e to the explaitation of mon by man in my form,
The abolition of unemployment and the systematic improvement of the material and cultural standards of the
toilers have been achieved already; the broad masses of the
workers and collective farmers are conscious builders of a
new and happy life.
Is it not dear to the masses of the workers and peasants
m o f the whole world that they are immediately interested in
the prosperity of the Soviet system and in the further victories of socialist construction in the Soviet Union? Is it
not clear to them that it is necessary to defend the socialist
fatherland of all the toilers? The socialist state points out
to the workers of all countries and to the oppressed of tho
whole world, the path of struggle and of victory, and it
mobilizes the revolutionary forces of the working class of
all countries against capitalism.
The bourgeoisie of all countries are seeking a way out
of the crisis by still further intensifying the exploitation of
the workers and peasants, by still further oppressing the
colonies, by still further enslaving the weak countriess'by
waging civil war against the toilers at home and by imperial-)
ist war for a new division of the 7iPOrld.
The bourgeoisie of all countries hate the Soviet Union
whose successes are mobilizing the forces of the proletariat
and of all the toilers for the revolutionary way out of the
crisis. The imperialists are striving to find a way out' of
their world of contradictions by means of a counter-revdutionary war against the Soviet Union. By its c~nsistent
policy of fighting for peace, and in particular by concluding
pacts of non-aggression with the bourgeois states, the Soviet
*

government is thwarting the plans of the interventionists and
i s proving to the niasses that it is not the U.S.S.R. that is
striving and preparing for war.
And if the imperialists commence their counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet Union. it will not be so easy
for them to deceive the masses by asserting that the Soviet
' LJnion is responsible for war.
At the same time it must be explained to the masses of
the toilers that, while signing pacts of non-aggression, the
imperialists are not ceasing their preparations for imperialist war. And every one of the imperialists, under cover of
these pacts, is simply waiting for the convenient moment to
unfurl its counter-revolutionary attack against the Soviet
e
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union,
The soviet Union done, in the whole of its policy, is really
wadng a struggle against war.
Tho French social-scoundrels know d l this perfectly well.
They strive to conceal this truth from the French workers
precisely because they serve their bourgeoisie in all its maneuvers. When French imperialism (in r
~ instigated
)
the
N r t h ' Chinese militarists to violate their treaty with the
U.S.S.R. concerning the Chinese-Eastern Railway and when
the U.S.S.R. put up resistance to this, the French Socialists
set up a howl about so-called Red imperialism. In 1933
French imperialism is alarmed by the growing aggressiveness of the German fascists. The French Socialists, pretending 'to sympathize with the German Communist Party, demand the rupture of relations between f i e U.S.S.R. and
fapjst
Germany.
. . *;,'I' ,:.:.
Is .it not clear thatthe French Socialists are not defending
the principles of proletarian internationalism, as they allege,
but the jatprests of French i&perialisrn ?. But I'Huw&tds
reply to Blum & Co- shows that the central organ of the
'

,

Communist Party of France does not fully understand the
foreign policy of the Soviet government. Similarly YHurnanite did not satisfactorily explain, not only to the broad
masses of the workers, but even to the members of the
Party, the policy the Soviet government pursued in concluding an agreement with France. In connection with the welcome given to Herriot during his visit to the U.S.S.R. the
Socialist press in France raised quite a hullabaloo. Le
IJopulaire, commenting on the opinions expressed by Soviet
statesmen concerning the peace policy pursued by Herriot,
wrote : While the Communists call them, the Socialists,
traitors for supporting the policy of Herriot, "Moscow
greets this policy as the dawn of a new era." (Paul Faure,
in Le Popddre, August 28, 1933.)
Although l ' i w m n i f e replied to this “demagogy" in a number of fairly good articles (Cachin, ~ c l e a u xFerrat,
,
Pierre
and others), nevertheless the policy of the Soviet government was not sufkiently explained, even to the members
of the Party. This alone can explain why the Montlucon
District Committee of the 1Comunist Party of Fmce
passed a resolution on the relations between the Soviet government and the French government i n which it stated:
"After a lengthy discussion on the present political situation, the
danger of war and the relations between the Soviet and F d
governments, the MOndto1con Diskkt Committee ddares:
1) That the visits of French statesmen (particularly that of
~ e r r i o t )were not sufficiently explained by the Communist Party
and its press.

2) That the Socialist leaders, on the basis of their declarations
(particularly the declaration of Cot on technical co-opeation between the air forces of the U.S.S.R. and of France), commenced
a furious attack against Russia and accused it of preparing for a
military alliance with France.

.

3) That PHwmzmh and the leaders of the Party did not sufficiently and opportunely react to this attack, apparently because they
did not understand the importance of it and the impression it could
make upon the workers.
4) That the attack caused dismay even in the Communist ranks
to d degree that on Sunday,. October 1, at the Youth Congress
in AUier, one of the members of the Party raised the question of
the poss'bility of a military alliance between France and Soviet

Russia.
Thc District Committee demands . . a clear explanation from
tbe leaders of the French Communist Party. ."

.

..

The Montlucon District Committee is right. How can the
members of the Party agitate properly against the Socialists
if they do not get a proper line fim their Party leaders ?
Was it difEcult to explain that the U.S.S.R. is pursuing a
policy of '*e
and of frihlly relations with all countries,
and that that is why the toilers of the Soviet Union were
pleased that the relations between France and the U.S.S.R.
have improved? Even before that the U.S.S.R. was in favor
of restoring nonnal relations with France, as with other
capitallst'cotltltries, aid so, it was not the position of the
Soviet Union that had changed, after the coup in Germany,
but the policy of France towards the U.S.SR. It is well
known that when imperialist France was not very much
afraid of Germany (when the Weimar Coalition was at
the head of Germany) it got Poland, Rumania and CzechoSlovakia to encircie the Soviet Union; it' was the initiator
of an attack upon the Soviet Union. Then the NationalSocialists, with their program of equal status for Germany,
revision of frontiers .and war, came into power. Imperialist
France had to change its tactics for a time. French imperiaism abandoned the role .of chief organizer of the antiSoviet front, signed a pact of non-aggression with the
U.S.S.R. and demonstrated its friendship with the %Get

Union. This change of tactics took place precisely because
the international situation had changed. Tomorrow it may
change again, and French imperialist circles may try, as the
Polish imperialist circles are trying, to strike a bargain with
German fascism.
Was this difficult to understand, difficult to explain? It
should ,have been explained to the masses that the Socialists
are spreading lying rumors about a military alliance between
the U.S.S.R. and France and about the manufacture of
munitions for the U.S.S:R. in order to hinder the successful
work of the Anti-War Committee, the Communist Party of
France and the Unitary Confederation of Labor, against
war. They spread this legend about the manuf'a~tureof
munitions for the U.S.S.R. as a pretext for facilitating the
unceasing supply of munitions to Japan. The French Communists have every opportunity of using the whole policy
of the Soviet Union as an illustration to prove to the workers concretely that the Soviet Union does not belong to any
coalition of imperialist states, that in its relations with other
states it is pursuing an independent, proletarian, class policy,
in the interests of the toilers of the whole world.
In Poland, the changed relations between the U.S.S.R.
and Poland were utilized extensively by the Polish Socialist
Party against the Communist Party of Poland. Notwithstanding the fact that the central Party press properly replied to the campaign of the Polish Socialist Party and bourgeois press, the local Party organizations were r a t k slow
in reacting to this campaign.
Now a campaign has commenced in the United States in
connection with the recognition of the U.S.S.R. It must be
observed that there is lack of clarity on this question even
among the Communists. As I have already said, we must

deprive the Social-Democrats of their demagogic "arguments" by explaining o u r position in a clear and sensible
manner.
t

The numerical growth of the Socialist Party of France
does not mean, however, that its position in the working class
has been strengthened during the past year. On the contrary,
the increasingly determined attack of the bourgeoisie on the
working class-particular1 y the reduction of wages and salaries of workers and civil servants on the one hand, and the
growing radicalization of new strata of workers, on the other
-is compelling the Socialist Party of France to maneuver
in various directions, and is even leading to a split in its
ranks. The neo-Socidists, led by Renaudel under the slo9"": Order, Authority and the Nation, are deliberately
s t r i ~ n gto excel the fascists in the fascization of the French
republic. In particular, they are supporting the "Left" governments of France in carrying out the financial plan of the
bourgeoisie to wipe out the deficit in the budget at the expense of the toilers. The majority of the party, led by Blum
and Faure, are carrying on "Left" maneuvers. They reject the proposal of the neo-Socialists and are compelled to
break away from them, which means a split in the Socialist
parliamentary group, because they fear that otherwise they
will rapidly lose the confidence of the workers and that the
Social-Democratic workers will begin to go over to the
Communists. Under cover of this maneuver, they are increasing their intimidation of the revolutionary-minded
workers in their own ranks, and they have expelled the Action-Sdcialist* group for taking part in the Amsterdam antiwar movement.
'

I

* ~ e f t - w i ngroup
~
in the Socialist Party of
40

France.-Ed.

4. Improvements in the Work of the Communist Party

4 France and of

the Unitary Confederatwn of Lcabm

The Communist Party is helping to disintegrate the Socialist Party of. France to a ver)r considerable extent, but it
. has been unable as yet to. take full advantage of the situation. Meetings organized by the Communist Party are attended by Socialist workers; the future will show whether
the Party will be able to consolidate for itself this discontent of the Socialist workers.
The Communist Party of France has achieved successes, .
not in many things, but successes nevertheless. The criticism
of'the Twelfth Plenum was not lost on it. I t is true that
the state of the leadership kar not.improved much, but still it
h.m improved. I n France we have a definite turn for the
better in regard to transferring the work oP the trade unions
to the factories. There are organizations' that have their
bases in the factories ('VoironMetdlurgie). At the Citroen
Works, where before the strike the unitary trade union had
almost no positions. 17 trade union sections have been organized. The Unitary Woodworkers' Union at Lyons has
I 7 seet&nt3,~ ~ a n i in
zd
factories& two a£.-whichfhe.-wx~k-~~
ers a r e organized .xoo per. cent. On September 16, 1933,~
the unitary trade unions had a t d ' of r # h trade u~imr
sections and groups in the factories and 400 factory and
trade union section newspapers (in order to avoid misunderstanding I must say that we have not verified these fi@.wues).
The only thing that is required now is that the work p h d d
be carried on properly. Some of the trade unions arca&- ginning to acquire; a number of mass auxiliary organs. ,to
serve the workers. For example the chauffeurs in ihe Department of the Seine have a legal advice bweaa for
matters connected with the arbitration courts, an ordinary
legal advice bureau, a solidarity fund, an insurance fund, a

'

sp&s club, a children's holiday camp and a home for aged
people. The Paris Trade Council has a legal advice bureau
on matters concerning arbitration, accident and social insurance, an unemployed insurahce fund, a library, etc. Similar
organizations have been set up by the Municipal Transport
Workers' Union in Paris, the d w a y workers in Amiens
Langol, the metal workers in St. Etienne and the miners in
pit No. 5 in Escarpel, etc.
All this is as yet a drop in the ocean, but they are on the
right road. They must march forward quickly and the results will soon be perceived.

a). Mt6muftite is the most powerful agitator the Cornm y i s t Party of France possesses. That is why the Central
Committee should appoint the best Party newspaper workers
to work on the staff of Z'Humamite. There must be better
guidance of the paper by the Political Bureau. The important campaigns should be conducted by the paper under the
direct guidance of the Political Bureau.
L'Huma~ite,and the other newspapers of the Communist
Party of France, must reply to the insinuations of the Socialists and of the trade union bureaucrats, not with abuse,
but with sensiMe explanations.
b) The Political Bureau-of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of France and the leaders of the unitary
trade unions should set up special departments to guide the
oppositional work in the reformist trade unions and other
mass reformist workers' organizations.
c) The Central Committee of the Communist Party of.
France, and the Communist fraction in the Unitary Confederation of Labor, must take all measures necessary to make
the unitary trade unions carry on their work in a revolu- .

tionary manner. They must improve their daily, painstaking
work in the factories and trade unions, and do it better than
the reformists. They must make careful preparations for
strikes, conduct them in a skilful manner, and enlist nonParty active workers in the leadership of strikes.
Strikes and the everyday work of the trade unions must
be utilized for the purpose of extending the influence of the
revolutionary trade unions and $or the purpose of consolidating this influence. The Communist Party of France does
not utilize the advantage it has in the possession of the unitary trade unions because the unitary trade unions work
badly. This must stop.
d) The Central Committee of the Communist Party of
France must carry on an extensive, energetic campaign
throughout the country and call mass workers' meetings, to
which members of the Socialist Party must unfailingly be invited, for the purpose of exposing the Socialist Party. The
speakers at these meetings must be carefully instructed by
the Party organizations, and special pains must be taken to
explain the reasons for the split in the Socialist Party, to
characterize each faction and prove that both factions are in
agreement in regard to supporting the bourgeois dictatorship, defending the bourgeois fatherland during war, figwng
against the Communists, etc.
The Sodalist workers mast be ckled upon to leave both
factions of the Socialist Party of France and to join the antifascist and the anti-war organizations, the unitary trade
unions and the Communist Party. A real united front must
be established with the l d organizations afKliated to the
Action Socidhte, and efforts must be made to get them to
join the Communist Party of France.
e) We must agitate better, work better and consolidate
the fruits of our work in France better.

B. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND T H E LABOR PARTY
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IN.NORWAY
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I now pass to Norway where the last elections revealed acolossal increase in the vote of the Labor Party and the
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2.

The Position of the Comcmukrt Party in the Trade
Uwkm Movement

After the split, the Communist Party of Norway had a
strong position in the trade unions in the big towns and in
the important industries.
In 1927, the Communist Party lost the majority on the
Trondheim Trades Council and in the Lumber Workers'
Union, but retained the leadership of the metal workers',
transport workers', and chemical workers' unions, and in
a number of small unions.

In 1930 the Labor Party and the trade union bureaucrats
split the trade unions in Bergen ; nevertheless, the majority
of the trade unions in Bergen remained in the hands .of
the Communists.
-

.

.

In view of the fact that the Communist Party failed to
devote sufficient attention to trade union work, and that the
Communists working in the trade unions committed many
opportunist and sectarian mistakes, the trade unions with
Communist majorities lost their members and the reformist
unions grew at their expense. Recently, as a consequence
of the intensification of the crisis, the worsening of @e conditions of the working class, and the more and more open
treachery of the reformists, a certain growth of the influence
of the revolutionary trade union opposition has been observed. Discontent in the reforhist unions with the policy
of compr&se pursued by the trade union bureaucrats towards the employers is increasing. At all congresses of trade
unions, strong oppositions were formed. For example, at
the Building Workers Congress, out of 202 delegates, the
Communist opposkion obtained 81 votes on various questions. In 1933. the Communists in Oslo secured the election

of 10 of their delegates to the Trades Council and now they
have 40 out of 300 delegates. In March, 1933, the Communist Party won the leadership in the Paper Makers' Union in
Ostfolt, the principal center of the paper industry.
But the Communist Party 05 Norway has failed, so far,
to make use of its positions in the reformist trade unions,
in order to :

a) recruit the workers into the Party;
b) to increase the circulation of the Party press;
c ) to turn the diseontent of the manbus of the reformist trade unions against the Labor Party of Norway.

This partly explains the r d t s of the recent parliamentary elections in which' the Labor Party obtained 125,000
votes more than it obtained in 1930. In the Ostfolt district
where the Communist Party has the majority on the Executive of the. Trades Council in the town of Sarbsborg, the
principal ifidustrial center of this region, the Norwegian
b : b r Party obtained 21,000 votes and the Communist
Party,266 votes. In Oslo, the Labor Party obtained 73,500
votes and the Communist Party, 1,700 votes.
The Communist members of trade unions managed more
or less to take advantage of the discontent of the members
of the reformist unions to organize an opposition against the
trade union bureaucrats, but they failed to learn how to
link up their work in the trade unions with agitation against
the treacherous Labor Party, which is behind the trade union
bureaucrats, notwithstanding the fact that it puts forward .
the demagogic demands for the allocation of 55,OOO,OOO
krone for combating the crisis, and organizes numerous demonstrations in support of these demands. The Communist
Party of Norway has been unable to expose Tranmael's

Labor Party in spite of the fact that it, like all the other
Social-Democratic parties, says one thing and does another;
it "says" that it will transform the imperialist war into civil
war, and yet, when the workers in the Raufe Works (in the
suburbs of Oslo) tried to prevent the transport of munitions
to Japan, the Tranmaelists acted as strikebreakers;
3. How the Nonvegion Commufikt Party Conducts
Agitation
a) Ths Unit~tiFront. In an article in the Arbeidsrbladet
of March I X , 1933, Tranmael wrote: "If one really wants
to pursue a common line, then one does not start by putting
forward conditions. Negotiations must be commenced on a
free basis." In reply to this statement the Arbeiderm, the
central organ of the Communist Party, in its issue of March
27, published a second letter addressed to the Central Committee of the Norwegian Labor Party in which it says: "We
must emphasize that our proposal must not be regarded as
a condition. I t is merely a proposal which we desire to discuss with the representatives of your party, and if in the
process of the negotiations better proposals be made, we of
course will be prepared to discuss them and agree to them."
Thus, the Communist Party of Norway accepted Tranmael's conditions for a united front instead of putting forward .the definite conditions for a united front with the
Social-Democratic Party that were published in the manifesto of the Communist International of March 5. I mk,
and probably you will all agree with me, that these conditions were obligatory also for the Norwegian section. But
instead of repelling Tranmael, the Norwegian Communist
Party, in its answer to him says: We are prepared to discuss and accept your proposals.

,

In April, 1933, the central organ of the C o e m i s t Party
published a resolution passed by the Metal Workers' Union
in Oslo which reads as follows: "The unity of the workers
will be possible only when all parties thrm aside their petty,
party interests and enter into negotiations without consideration for their factional positions and without any prelkninary conditions." The central organ and the Political Bureau of the Comnlunist Party of N o . m y expressed their
complete agreement with this resolution and did not think it
necessary to make any critical remarks concerning it.

b) Fm&m. In a number of articles Tranmael declared
thert in the interests of the working class of 'Norway -the
Labor Party must take power into its hands. I n reply to
this a member of the oxeative of the rev~lutionarytrade
union opposition wrote a letter to the central organ of the
f&mmunist Party in which he said that the Communist Party
should support the'dmand for the formation of a SocialDemocratic government with the object of avoiding the fate
that Melt the working class of Germany under Hitler (Arb d m e n , -October 27, 1933). and the editors of the eentraf
organ did not say a single sensible word by way of comment
on this "argument."
c ) W h o is respotwible for the split in the working class?
In reply to a statement made by Tranmael that, owing to
thb attacks of the Comintern on the policy of the Second
Interimtimd, a united working dass is impossible, GomI&
Khstiznsen, secretary of the Communist Party of Norway, i ~ ai speech at the. students' meeting held in Oslo on
Masdr ~8,1933,said that in the present situation it was no
use d&ssing who was responsible for the split in the working &ass, :the Communists or the Social-Democrats.
d) Soci&-Dcntocratic Slogans.

In connection with, the

.

liberal bourgeois minimum grogram, which the Labor Party
advanced as the program for a Social-Democratic ,-gov-vernment, the central organ of the Communist Party, in
its issue of October 24, 1933, writes : "Nearly half a million adult .workers and small peasants stand for the proud
slogans of Social-Democracy," "Forward to a free, social'st Norway!" "The whole nation must set to work! And
we declare that our electors will fulfil their duty if it comes
to fighting for these slogans." I think that. only conscious
or unconscious agents of the Labor Party could "agitate"
against the Labor Party. in this way,

k

In the same issue of October 24, 1933, we read the following profound arguments concerning the character of the
workers' government which Tranmael has in mind: "The
crisis and the disintegration of bourgeois society has made
it absolutely necessary for the bourgeoisie to pursue a reactionary policy that is openly hostile to the wiorking class in
order to retain their profits and class privileges, and for
these purposes a workers' government (apparently a Tranmaelist government-4.P.) amnot be utilized." That b
horp'otu party "expos&' the treacherous policy of SocialDemocracy.
4. Conclusions
.

After such a "struggle" waged by the central organ of
a ~
the Norwegian
the Communist Party of ~ 6 r w against
Labor Party, is it surprising that the workers at the last
elections almost, entirely voted for the Labor Party ? .
a)

b) Can the workers understand the irreconcilable disagreements between the Cokmunists and the social-~emocrats if the central organ of the Communist Party writes
about the united front in this way?
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c) With such a policy, and with such work carried on by
the Communists in the trade unions, is it possible to acquire
influence among the masses of the workers and consolidate
it?
d) The Presidium of the Plenum ought to appoint a commission to investigate the situation in the leadership of the
C o m n i s t Party of Norway; but this does not m&n that
Chose comrades who brought the Party to this state of isolation from the masses should be restored.
C.

THE CCXUUXWT PARTY OF CZECHOISLOVAgIA
I.

After the TweIf th Plenum

At the Twelfth Plenum, the Communist party of CzechoSlovakia was praised for having managed to conduct a number a* big strikes and having drawn into these strikes workers of all trends, including the reformists. But at this very
Twelfth Plenum it was pointed out that, while organizkg
and leading these strikes, presumably by applying the tactics
of the revolutionary united front, the Communist Party of
~Cz&ho-~Slovakia
concealed its Party face. At the time, however, this fact was not so completely revealed as it has been
during the past year. The Cornintern had to point this out
on several occasions. The Social-Democratic Parties of
CzechorS40vakia (Germans and Czechs) are represented in
the g o v e k e n t . They, in conjunction with the bourgeoisie,
are gradually introducing a fascist dictatorship in the country, they are introducing measures which worsen the p i - tion of the workers, of the peasants and of office employees,
However,
under the guise of fighting for "democracy."
instead oS exposing the social-~emocraticParties as such,
the Chnmunist Party, for the sake of the united front, as
they o p p o ~ i s t i c a l l yinterpret it, limited themselves to &ti-

cizing only the -Social-Democratic leaders. Apparently, for
the sake of the same opportunistically interpreted "unity of
the working class," no Communist work is carried on in the
reformist trade unions, notwithstanding the scores of decisions passed by the Comintern and by the Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party itself on the necessity of carrying on
such work. Similarly, the lC~rnmunistParty did not take
advantage of all the favorable opportunities that presented
themselves to organize the discontent of the masses of the
workers. The Red trade unions have not increased their
membership at the expense of the reformist trade unions
which exist side by side with them.
2.

The Work of the Red a d Reformist Trade U&ns

By comparing the data on the state of the Red trade
unions and rehrmist trade unions of metal workrs and
miners, and by analyzing their work, we shall be able to see
why. we have failed to win the workers away from the reformist unions, and why we have even lost positions. The
following figures indicate the membership of the respective
unions :
Reformist Trade Unions
Red Trade Unions
Metal Workers
Czech union. ........68,871
January I, 1933. .. .22,075
German union. ......zg,oar
Figures not &ailable
July I, 1933.. ......25,741 .
Miners
Czech union ......17,574
1932 ....g.......12B36
Czech union ......16,052
July, 1933 ........ I I,om
German union. .... .13,350
Thus, the Red Miners' Union lost 1;836 members, while
the Czech reformist union gained 602 members.

t
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I now pass to the work of the Red trade unions and reformist trade unions. The Red Metal Workers' Union has
140 local organizations and 21 factory-groups. But these
local groups do not carry on any genuinely mass work in
the factories. The district committees of the Red trade
unions do not guide the work of the local groups, they do
not command sufficient authority, and they lack initiative.
The reformist Metal Workers' Union has 353 local
groups. These groups are much more active than ours.
The district committees work independently, and are authoritative podia.
Benefits : the scale ofi unemployed benefits and the period
of eligibility for benefits are about the same in the Red trade
unions .and in the reformist trade unions; but the scale of
benefits for the lower scales of contributions is from 8 to 10
per cent lower in the Red Metal Workers' Union than in
the reformist union.
Crisis benefit (paid after 26 weeks of normal benefit) is
65 per cent lower in the Red Metal Workers' Union than in
the reformist union The scale of strike benefits paid by the
Red trade unions and reformist metal workers' unions are
about the same. But in big strikes the Red trade unions do
not always adhere to their scale, and the amount of strike
pay paid out depends upon the amount of money collected.
The reformist union, however, usually pays strike pay in
full. After the fourth week of a strike the reformist union
usually pays an extra family allowance of ro krone per week.
In addition to the benefits already mentioned, the reformist Metal Workersv Union also has sick and disablement
benefits. The union imposes a levy of 50 hellers a week for
this fund which is collected together with the trade union
dues.

Agitation and promando is conducted by the Red trade
unions exclusively by means of the press and leaflets. Even
during
- the election of the factory committees no oral agitation and propaganda was carried on. Slogans and demands
are drawn up by the Executive Committee of the union and
for that reason they are not sufficiently concrete for each of
the given trades. The lower 'organizations rest content with
the material issued by the central body of the union and
themselves do nothing to popularize these general slogans
and demands in the factories, nor do they link them up with
the everyday needs of the workers in the given factories.
Generally speaking, the agitation carried on by the Red trade
unions is of an abstract character. The lanqaage of the
trade ~ n i o npress differs in w way from the larzguage of the
Party press.
The reformist union not only carries on agitation and
propaganda in the press, but also orally. It issues only onetenth of the leaflets and manifestoes issued by the Red trade
unions. What i s important, however, is that these leaflets
and manifestoes are issued by the local branch of-the union
and not by the Executive Committee, and- for that-reason
they deal with the questions that interest. the workers in the given town and in the given -factory. Moreover, the union.
concentrates its agitation on questions concerning various
measures of relief for the members; the slogans and demands put forward to the workers by the reformist trade
unions are linked up with the demagogic proposals which the .
Social-Democratic Party in parliament and the Social-Democratic ministers in the government put forward. By that,
the trade unions systematically popularize among the ~msses
of the workers the activities of the Social-Democratic dep- uties and ministers. The Social-Democrats and the ref ormist
unions display great activity in the factories in painstaking
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work and agitation. They devote special attention to oral
agitation, which the Red trade unions do not do.
While the Social-Democrats and the' reformists skilfully
carry on work with individual workers in the factories to
induce them to support the Social-Democratic measures of
the government, the Red trade unions do not, with the same
persistence, carry on agitation against the Social-Democrats
and ref ormist trade union bureaucrats, 'whose activities daily
provide a wealth of new material for their exposure.
What are the results of this kind of "work"?
Loss of membership in the Red miners' union, in spite
of the fact that this year mass fights were waged under its
leadership in 1Bru.x and in Rositz, which, however, were not
utilized1for the purpose of consolidating our influence. The
local organizations function very badly. In Brux, for example, out of IOO pits there are only 13 pit groups, and these
work badly. In the Rositz district, where in 1931 the Red
miners' union had 17 members on pit committees, in 1933
it did not secure the election of a single delegate.
In spite of the influx of new members in the Red metal
workers' union, there is a considerable loss in the decisive
enterprises in the metallurgical industry. At the last factory
committee elections we lost from 40 to 45 per cent of our
vote.
The relation if fo~cesbetween the reformist, fascist and
Red unions iq the factory committees in 142 metallurgical
enterprises is as follows :

Czech reformist union. .....IOI members
Fascist union. ............. 25 members
Red union ................ g members

(71.3%)

During the election of factory committees in the metallur-

cal industry in the German region, the total of 483 memo
ers were distributed in the following way:
Red trade union ........................ 15 seats
German reformist union ................. -376 seats
Czech rebrmist union ..................... 18 seats
German National-Socialist Union .......... 38 seats

4

Generally speaking, in a number of decisive enterprises
the Red trade unions have suffered considerable setbacks
d defeats in the factory committee elections during the
st few months. For example, in one of the big enterises belonging to the Bohemia-Moravia Co. in Prague,
, in 1932, obtained 27.3 per cent of the total vote, and in
33 only 19.5 per cent of the total vote. At the Kolben
rks in Prague, we, in 1932, obtained 27.9 per cent of the
otal vote, and in 1933 only 16.8 per cent. A few weeks ago
he factory committee elections took place at the Vitkovice
ron Works, one of the largest enterprises in Czecho-Sloakia, and one which is of enormous importance in the pre.parations for war, Here we lost Ia per cent of our votes
' -S
cOrn@ft?d &th 1932.

3. United Front Tactics
After the Twelfth Plenum, a number of articles appedred
1 the Communist Party press in which the tactics of the
united front were interpreted as a bloc between the Communist Party and the Social-Democratic Party. The question of Communist leadership in the united front of struggle was absolutely ignored. These opportunistic articles
caused the Communists to place their hopes on negotiations
between the Communist and the Social-Democratic Intema+ionals, and to please the Social-Democrats and renegades,
me Communists were urged to refrain from criticizing and

'

exposing these traitors. The mistakes committed in the
press of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia on the
.question of the united front assume all the greater significance in that they became very widespread in the Party.
After the Comintern had issued the appeal to form a
united proletarian front (in March this year), the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia
made a proposal to the two Social-Democratic Parties, to the
Czech National Socialists (the party of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Benesh, and to the Czech Socialists, to
form a 'united front. In doing so the Central Committee
committed a very serious blunder in that it did not, from the
very outset, in its invitation to these organizations, clearly
and openly explain to the masses of the workers the reactionary role that Social-Demracy was playing. As a consequence of this mistake, the face of. the Party became still
more blurred as the united front campaign developed, and
it led finally to a very definite tendency on the part of the
Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia to distort the policy
of the united front into a bloc with Social-Democracy.
4.

The Mktakes of the C. P. of ,Czer~o;Slovekiaa d Their-R e d t s -.--

It must be said that:
a) The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and the Red
trade unions were unable to utilize the mass miners' strikes,
which took place under their leadership, for the purpose of
extending their influence, and of consolidating this influence,
by drawing the miners into the Red unions, and hence proved
incapable of striking a strong blow at the reformist miners'
union.
b) They failed to utilize the enormous dissatisfaction with
the reformist leaders on the part of the members of the

.

metal workers' union which, in spite of orders of the trade
union bureaucracy to the contiary, got Comrade Zaptotsky
to address a huge mass meeting.
C) The above defects are to be explained by the fact that
Red trade
Czecho
~ A u n i s Party
t
unions had not yet learned to carry on painstaking mass
work, to carry on agitation in a popular manner, to extend
their influence and organizationally consolidate it, and also
by the fact that they took up an opportunist position on a
number of political questions generally, and an incorrect
attitude toward Social-Democracy in particular, and especially by the mistakes they committed in carrying out the
united front tactics. Is it surprising after this that the
workers do not see the enormous difference that exists between the Communist and the Social-Democratic parties, and
that, as a consequence o f our clumsv agitation. thev believe
that the only difference is that the Social-Democratic leaders
are traitors and that it is only necessary to remove these
leaders in order to transform the Social-Democratic Party
into a revolutionab party?
This is the main reason why the Communist Party of
Czecho-Slovakia failed to mobilize the masses arrainst the
suppression of the Young Communist League, the mass organizations and the Party press.

a) In addition to publishing the legal and illegal press and
leaflets, it is necessary to car& on oral, group and individual
agitation.
b) It is necessary to consolidate the influence of the Red
trade uaions and of the Party.
c) It is necessary to intensify the work in the reformist
trade unions, and to direct a hurricane fire against the Ger-

C
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man and Czech trade union bureaucrats and Social-Democrats.
d ) The leadership must give a proper line to the whole
Party, and the opportunists in the Party must be exposed.
Do
I.

ENGLAND

The C.P.G.3. Does Not Cornoldate I t s Influence
Among the Masses

In England, before the last parliamentaty election, mass
demonstrations were organized as a result of the very widespread discontent of the masses with the 10 per cent cut in
the salaries of civil servants, the unemployed relief cuts, and
the Means Test. The unemployed movement was led by
the National Unemployed Workers' Movement and the correct line adopted by the D d y Worker on this question
exercised a great influence upon the members of the Independent Labor Party, as well as upon the workers who follow its lead. This can explain the resolution passed by the
I.L.P.conference on the desirability of establishing a united
front with the Communists and of supporting the N.U.W.M.
However, the Communist Party of Great Britain' failed
to take full advantage of the favorable situation, it did not
increase its membership, it did not increase its work in the
reformist unions, and did not consolidate its influence in
them. More than that, the Communist Party of Great
Britain did not even utilize the "solidarity movement'' for
the purpose of consolidating the increased influence it obtained as a result of this movement.
2.

The Maneuvers of the I;L.P. and the Mistakes of
the C.P.G.B.

The Communist Party did not take full advantage of the
correspondence between the Cornintern and the I.L.P. in
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order to win over to its'side individual organizations of the
I.L.P. or any considerable numbers of the members of the
I.L.P. It did not see through the maneuvers of the leaders
of the I.LP. against the united front, and failed to appreciate
the very definite discontent of the members of this party in
a number of local organizations with their leaders' policy of
sabotaging the Derby Conference resolution on the united
front. It did not even give a proper reply to the I.L.P.
leaders who resorted to the counter-revolutionary services
of Trotsky. The latter, in order to prevent the members of
the 1.L.P. from joining the Communist Party, poured forth
a &ream of lies against the Communist International.
' w h a t was this maneuver? Everyone here knows that at
the Derby Conference of the I.L.P. the leaders spoke and
voted against the resolution adopted by the conference calling upon the leaders to ask the C d n t e r n in what way the
I.L.P.could help the former in its work. A long correspondence followed. Our letter to the I.L.P. was couched in
dear and simple terrns that every workers could understand. It very dearly and sharply described our differences
with the 1.L.P. With this document. we wanted to help our
English Party strengthen its work among the members of
the 1.L.P. What was the position in the I.L.P. at that time?
The majority of the members were in favor of a united front
with the C.P.G.B., of rapprochement with the Comintern.
The leaders of the I. L. P. were opposed to this. Clearly,
our task was to drive a wedge between the leaders who
sabotaged the Derby resolution and the members of .the
I.L.P., who were in favor of the resolution. But owing to
the fact that our English Party failed to develop the necessary activity among the members of the I.L.P., a dual
pmess took place: a section of the members of the I.L.P.
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who belonged to the Right wing, and who were dissatisfied
with the Derby resolution, returned to the Labor Party,
from which the I.L.P. had only recently disaffiliated. The
other section, which belonged to the Left wing, influenced
by our exposure of the sabotage of the leaders on the one
hand, and not being pulled together by the work of the Communists, which would have drawn them into the Communist
Party, on the other hand, left the I.L.P. and abandoned
politics altogether. As a result, our influence, which might
have caused members of the I.L.P. to join our Party, was
weakened.
Actually sabotaging the decision of the Derby conference,
the leaders of the I.L.P. started a long, diplomatic correspondence; In order to pretend that they were carrying out the
Derby decision they sent an enquiry to the Comintern asking
in what way the I.L.P. could assist it; but they did not
make a single concrete proposal. At the same time, they
evidently proposed the following division of labor to the
district leaders : the National Council of the I.L.P., i.e., the
central leadership, is to continue formal negotiations in accordance with the Derby resolutions, while the leadership
OF the local organizations, notwithstanding the desires of
their members, is openly to oppose the united front. As a
result of this maneuver, the following situation was created :'
in its letter to us the National Council of the 1.L.P; does not
openly reject our proposal but restricts itself to polemical
remai-ks, and adopts a resolution on strengthening the united
front in England. At the same time it succeeds in getting
several local organizations OF the I.L.P. to pass resolutions
against the united front decision. Our Party did not understand this maneuver. The Daily Worker wrote that the
resolution of .the National Council of the I.L.P. was a step
forward. Very belatedly our newspaper reported cases of

openly expressed hostility of local I.L.P. leaders towards
the united front. Placing its hopes on the evolution of the
National Council of the I.L.P. to our side, our Party allowed
the decisive moment for winning the members of the I.L.P.
to slip by.

It must be admitted that we have not yet obtained as much
as we d d and should have obtained from this correspondence. We have not increased the membership of our Party
at the expense of the Independent Labor Party; we have
not won over whole organizations, which was quite possible.
Meanwhile, Trotsky comes onto the scene in order to develop
his counter-revolutionary attack on the Soviet Union in the
pages of the New Leader, and, while criticising the I.L.P.
from the right, creates the necessary smoke screen for the
maneuvers of the National Council to deceive the working
class members of the I.L.P. The Communist Party, and
our central organ, failed also ti, expose Trotsky's counterrevolutionary outburst.
Our Party must exert enormous effort to make up for
what it has. lost in this campaign.
3. The Work of the Scottish RevoluCionwy a d Reformist

M a s ' U&ra
The recent municipal elections have shown that the dommunist Party had not increased its influence among the
working class in Great Britain to any considerable degree.
The Communist Party has not even organized the work of
the only union that we have, the United ~ i n e w o r K e ~ofs
Scotland.
At the present time the revolutionary United Mineworkers oft Scotland has 3,000 members (the majority of . w b
are in Fife ; in 1931 the reformist union had nearly 8,000).
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The reformist union has 20,ooo members. The revolutionary
union has 49 branches, of which only two are organized on
a pit basis; the rest organize the miners qccording to place
of residence, in the mining villages. The union is in a bad
way financially. Its expenditure considerably exceede its
income, which is due mainly to the large number of paid
,officials. Thus, in addition to paid organizers, .who also collect membership dues, the union has special dues collectors
who m i v e a salary, and a percentage on dues collected in
addition. The reformist union has 54 branches in Fifeshire
alone and 92 in Lanarkshire.
How is work carried on in these two unions?
In I@, at the time of the split, the Cornrnunisfk had
strong fractions in all the branches of the revolutionary union
and in its leading bodies, the executive committee and delegate council (in the leading bodies alone there were 69
Commuaists). At the present time only @ Party members
are organized in the Red miners' union. In the reformist
miners' union, the Communists have no positions whatever.
Out of 370 pits (of which 60 are large pits) the revolutionary union carries on work only in 16. Although it secures improvements for the workers in separate struggles,
insufficient advantage is taken of these successes to extend
and organizationally consolidate influence acquired by organizing pit committees, etc. This year the union carried on
considerable work in the election of pit inspectors (hitherto
safety conditions in the mines had been ignored). In spite
of all the efforts of the reformists to pour ridicule on the
campaign developed by our union, the latter managed to
secure the election of 10 inspectors in 5 pits, all members
of the revdutionary miners' union, although the reformists
also put up their candidates. But these inspectors did not
use the material they collected, on the violation of the safety

regulations, in order to mobilize the masses in the pits to
fight against these irregularities.
Under the guidance of the Red union, 8 pit papers are
published. Although these papers publish a fair amount of
workers' correspondence; correctly present political questions, played a big part in the aforementioned election of
inspectors, they, however, do not deal sufficiently with the
work of their own union, do not give the officials guidance
as to how to carry on their work and above all, they do not
sufficiently fight against the reformist miners' union.
Generally speaking, the guidance of the work of the local
organizations and eels of the Red trade union is very
weak, notwithstanding the relatively large number of paid
officials. The committees of the local unions do not hear
reports on the work of these officials, do not concretely criticise the defects in this work, and in the majority of cases
limit themselves to passing re'solutions on the inactivity of
the local branches.
In the summer of 1933, the union developed a wide campaign throughout the coalfield against the wage cuts, for a
10 per cent increase in wages, for a 7-hour day without reduction of wages, for the abolition of overtime, for improvement of safety measures, etc. Commenting on this campaign, ,Mr. Ebby Edwards, General Secretary of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, speaking in Swinton,' Yorkshire, said:
"We are ready tomorrow to negotiate with the employers not
merely to prevent a reduction of wages, but to put the industry
It is not my intention
outside the pale of continual codict
to call a union stoppage in July, but to obtain 100 per cent uGon
membership to prevent a stoppage.
( D d y Worker, April 22,
1933.)

...

. . ."

In spite of the fact that the reformists so clearly ignored

the pressing needs of the miners, the campaign developed
by the Red union was not crowned with success, precisely
because. it did not sufficiently expose the reformist trade
union bureaucrats.
The Red union organized Women's Guilds for the wives
of $$ members. These women's guilds organize outings,
social evenings, concerts, etc., for the purpose of collecting
fbnds. But neiiher the leaders of the union nor the Party
-organizations devote constant attention to these guilds, do
not widen their field of activity, and do not draw them into
political work.
.
The reformist unions, however, in their mass work make
wide use of! the Miners' Institutes, which are built up with.
money from the Miners' Welfare Fund. These institutes,
which exist in every village, have halls for meetings and
dances, gymnasiums, billiard rooms, reading rooms and
libraries. Frequently, lectures are arranged. In a number
of institutes, technical training courses are organized for the
miners. Throughout the whole of Scotland (with the exception of Fife, where the revolutionary union is stronger
than the reformist union), it is only the reformist union
that utilizes the Miners' Institutes for mass work. Moreover the reformists have access to the Workers' Educational
Association, which organizes classes on various subjects in
many places.
The revolutionary union does nothing to combat the influence of these organizations.
c.

4. A Few ConcZUSiOm

Thus, the Communist Party of Great Britain and the Revolutionary Miners' Union have all the advantages of putting
forward the urgent demands of the workers and of fighting
for these demands but they are unable to mobilize the masses

for the struggle against the reformist unlon, they are unable
on this basis to organize the work in the reformist union
(after the split nearly all the Communists left that union),
they are unable to increase their membership and consolidate
I their influence.
W That being- the case,'how can the Communist Party of
Britain increase its membership and consolidate its
influence if the Communists do not work in the unions, or
work badly, that is to say, do not fight to obtain influence?
And yet, in England, if work in the trade unions were carried on properly and energetically, influence could be won
and consolidated.
h' At the present time new wage cuts .are being imposed in
England and the conditions of the unemployed are being
greatly worsened. The National Government, at the head
of which is one of the ex-leaders of the Second ~nternational, is introducing a number of terrorisfic measures against
the working class, the like of which England has never
known behre. In the British trade unions discontent is
growing. In a number of trade unions (engineers, railwaymen, etc.) there is a change of temper in favor of the Cemmunist Party, of a united front, etc. The Communist Party
must at all costs increase its membership by enlisting members of the most important trade unions and employed workers.
?. I come now to Germany.
E. G E R M A N Y

.

The ~ c h i e v e m e l r of
t ~ tke Communist Party of Germany
Before Hitler came to power, the Communist Party of
Germany had achieved considerable success in mobilizmg
and organizing the masses for the revolutionary struggle
ainst fascism.
I will enumerate a few of these:
- - 2 >:
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a ) In November, 1932, the Party obtained 6,000,ooo votes
in the parliamentary elections, and in the big, industrial tenters it received the highest percentage d votes.
b) It organized a number of big strikes against the Papen
wage cuts decree. It w a ~only because of this that the
decree was held in abeyance, and, in spite of the opposition
of the reformists, the workers in a very short period of time
achieved successes in their struggtes. c) In spite of the unceasing sabotage of the Social-Democratic Party and the reformists, the Communist Party of
Germ-anymanaged in a number of cases to organize a united
front from below with local Social-Democratic workers to
resist the fascist gang$ that attacked trade union and Party
premises. Whenever the workers put up resistance against
the fascists the Communists were in the front ranks and
received the heaviest blows of the. class enemy ; they displayed fine examples of self-sacrifice and indomitableness
in the struggle.
d) The Communist Party of .Germany increased its membership by tens of thousands and waged a determined struggle against the Neumann-Remmele group which hampered
mass work.
e) The mass organizations that were under the leadership
of the Party, principally the Red trade union opposition, intensified their work and strengthened their contacts with the
broad strata of the workers.
f ) At the time Hitler came into power the Communist
Party of Germany managed to organize demonstrations and
political .strikes in a number of towns and enlisted Soci-alDemocratic workers in the struggle against fascism. The
social-Democratic Party alone is responsible for the victory
of fascism. It split the working class ;it opposed the united
proletarian front of revolutionary struggle by a united re-
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actionary front with the bourgeoisie ;it hamstrung the working class by means of the centralized mass organizations at
the head of which it stood.
g) In its resolution of April I, 1933, "On the Present
ituation in Germany," the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. stated
hat the political line and the organizational policy of the
Party of Germany, before, and at the time the
sts came to power, were quite correct. I have no doubt .
the Plenum will fully approve of the resoltttion passed
he Presidium of the E.C.C.I.on the German question.
his resolution on Germany was one of the most imol&ons passed since the Twelfth Plenum. '
this resolution is very closely connected with
nother very important document, viz., the document on the
nited front. It is well known that the parties affiliated to
e Second International hurled themselves upon the Gern Communist Party in order to conceal its own treachery,
eachery of the G e r m Sd-Democrats. It tried to
e it appe;)r that the responsibility for the coming into
wer of the d s t s rested not only on the German Socialernocrats, but also on the Communist International and
n the Communist Party of Germany. The Sodal-Democrats
,f all countries lied to the workers, saying: the Communists
lso failed to fight against fascism; they did not call for
surrection, for a strike, or sabotage. If the leaders of any
ne of our sections have failed to understand our dacunat,
ich raised the question as to whether a party can or
uld, in the absence of a revolationary situation and when
t has not got a majority of the working class' behiad it,
opt an adventurist policy and call for an armed uprishqg.
they have not understood thist how can they fight against
h) After the Hitler coup, the Communist Party of Get67

many very quickly reorganized itself for underground work.
In spite of the exceptionally cynical and despicable provocation on the part of the Hitler government from the very
first days of its unbridled dictatorship, the.majority of the
workers who followed the Communist Party remained loyal
to the Party. In spite of the raging White terror, 4,600,ooo
electors in the Reichstag elections, on March 5, voted f ~ the
r
Communist Party. And to vote for the Communist Party on
that day, when the whole apparatus of the state and all the
parties were directed against us, and when such acts of
provocation as the burning of the Reichstag were perpetrated
against us, was not a simple thing. It was an act of heroism
on the part of the masses of the workers of Germany.
2 4

Defects in the Wwk of the CommuGst Party of
Germany

It goes without saying that with all the great successes
achieved by the Communist Party of Germany before the fascists' coming to power and now, when it is working underground, it committed, and is committing certain mistakes.
1. want to mention same of these because the Communist'
Party of Germany, as well as the other Communist Parties,
must avoid these mistakes in the future.
'

,

It must be admitted that before Hitler came to power the
Communist Party of Germany, largely through the fault of
.Neumann, who was then in the leadership, devoted very little attention, in its agitation among the broad masses of the
people, co the struggle against the badage of Versailles ;and
yet, the discontent of the masses with the Versailles Treaty
was v e j great. It was not the Communist Party of Germany but the Nationalists and the National-Socialists who,
for their demagogic purposes, took advantage of the dis-

content over the whole of Germany, and as far back as 1928
put forward the demand for a referendum against the Young
Plan. Instead of taking the initiative in raising the question of fighting against the Versailles Treaty before the
masses, if only in the form of a referendum against the
Young Plan, and explaining that only a Soviet Germany, in
alliance with the proletariat of other countries, could throw
off the yoke of Versailles, and instead of simultaneously
waging a determined struggle against the chauvinistic provocation of the masses by the National-Socialists, the Communist Party of Germany sneered at the demand put forward
by the Nationalists and National-Socialists. The number
of votes cast in favor of a referendum, and during the
referendum itself, showed that the demand of the Nationalists and of the National-Socialists met with a wide
response among the masses of the petty bourgeoisie, and
perhaps also among a section of the workers.
Thus, the Communist Party of Germany not only failed
to take the initiative in this movement, but that section of
the population which voted for the proposal of the Nationalists and National-Socialists, interpreted the attitude of the
Cornrnunist Party towards the referendum as expressing
lack of desire on the part of the Communists to fight againit
the Versailles Treaty.
The Communist Party ,of Germany did not with sufficient
persistence and intensity wage a campaign against the Weimar Coalition, and principally against Social-Democracy,
against all the heasures introduced for the purpose of worsening the position of the workers and peasants (wage reductions, reductions of unemployed relief, the ruination of
the peasantry by taxation, debts, etc.). The National-Socialists took advantage of the widespread discontent with
these measures in order to win over to their own side the

.

broad masses of the people, including a section of unemployed workers.
The agitation the Communist Party waged against the
fascists was not popular in style, was not concrete and did
not penetrate deeply among the masses. . In its agitation,'the
Communist Party of Germany did not utilize the experience
of what had already taken place in those countries where
fascism was alreidy in power (Poland, and particularly
Italy), viz., that fascism did not carry out a single one of
the lavish demagogic promises it had made before it came
into power.
Take, for example, some of the promises made by the
Italian fascists, which they published as far back as 1919,
such as: land for the peasants, the confiscation of a considerable part of the capital of the country, workers' control
of industry, the confiscation of war profits, abolition of the
Senate, convocation of a Constituent Assembly which was to
express the will of the people for a republic or monarchy,
independence and complete liberty o f urban and rural selfgovernment, universal suffrage, including woman suffage.
In his speeches Mussolini went even further and, in addition
to all this, promised to ."expropriate all the large landed
estates, steamships, mines and all forms of transport. When
we (i.e., the fasdsts-Q.P.) will have settled with Asiatic
Bolshevism, we will abolish the capitalists and landlords."
Although the German fascists did not go as far as that,
they, nevertheless, in their furious demagogy, borrowed not
a little from the lying promises of Mussolini and his cutthroats. In order more convincingly to prove to the masses
that Hitler and his gangs were striving, not to satisfy t h e
needs of the workers, the peasants, offre employees, the
urban petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, etc., but to establish the terrorist dictatorship of monopolist capital, furiously
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intensify the exploitation of the workers, ruthlessly to ruin
the main masses of the peasantry, to rob the urban petty
urgeoisie, etc., the German Communists, in their agitation
inst the National Socialists, should have compared the
ornises made by Mussolini before he came into power with
e program he actually did carry out and is now pursuing.
According to the ofkid returns taken from Italian fascist
urces (hence it can be taken that the figures are minimfrom the summer of 1927 to the end of 1931, the
of the Italian workers in various industries dropped
ent, while red wages dropped 24-45 per cent (the
are due to a slight reduction in prices).
By all sorts of special laws the landlords were relieved
their laborers against accidents, while
the red wages of agricultural laborers declined 34.2 per cent
the period from 1919to 1932.
Even before the German fascists, the Italian fascists said:
r the unemployed." And yet, accordst figures, in March 1932, there were in Italy
053,076 unemployed, while unemployed relief was paid
286,624 unemployed, and only for a period of n days.
n December 1932, the numba of unemployed rose, but the
iving relief dropped and the amount of relief
was reduced by 45 per cent. And yet, every worker mwt
ntribute to the unemployed fund (the fund is made up
50 per cent contributed by the workers and 50 per cent

Even before the German f d s t s , the Italian f a x W
oled the unemployed by promising the needy winter rdief.
in the winter of 1931-32 this winter relief in I d y
unted to the payment of 15 centimes per day to ~gg+668
persons (a newspaper costs 20 centimes). This is
from the fwt that immediately the fascists came to
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power in Italy, strikes were prohibited, the trade unions were
seized, the 'workers' press was destroyed, etc.
All these and similar facts were, of course, known to the
German ~ornmunists,~but
they did not make proper use of
them in their agitation against the f k s t s . Even if, at
the time, a section of the workers would not have'believed
the Communists had they said that the German fascists
would follow in the footsteps of the Italian fascists, this
agitation would have been of great significance, because the
workers who had been deceived by the fascists would have
realized afterwards that the Communists had spoken the
truth and this, of course, would have accelerated the penetration of Communist influence among these backward strata
of the working class.
Very belatedly, the Communist Party of Germany, in
national
August 1930, issued its program for the social
liberation of the German people. The publication of this
program, and the propaganda developed in connection with
it, was very useful to the Communist Party of Germany,
although Rote Fahne, of which Neumann was at the head
at the time, distorted the slogan of a "people's revolution"
and adapted it to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie (the
proletarian class content of the slogan-the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat-was deleted
from it). But very soon the Party organizations almost
forgot about this program.
There is no need h r me to repeat all that has been said
a l . a d y .about the defects -in the work of the Communist
Party of Germany among the unemployed. The few unemplo$ed committees that existed did not embrace the very
strata of the unemployed that were deprived of even charitable reliei, and yet it was among this section of the unemployed that the fascists achieved most success.

In spite of numerous decisions, resolutions, declarations,
etc., the organizations of the Communist Party of Germany
did not really devote proper attention to improving the work
in the factories. They did not establish new contacts at the
time when, with the growth of fascism, the members of the
Party and of the Red trade union opposition began to be
discharged in ever increasing numbers. The result of this
was soon felt. At the time of the fascist corp the influence
of the Communist Party in the factories was insignificant,
and a section of the workers who feared dismissal began
to join the fascist factory organizations, and were not restrained from doing this by the Communists and the members of the Red trade union opposition.
The work of the Communists in the reformist unions
and in other mass organizations had not improved very
much by the'time Hitler came into power.
The Communists and the members of the Red trade union
opposition represented an insignificant percentage in the
factory committees. But the fact that the majority of the
Red factory committees, and the members of the Red factory committees, did not work any better than the reformists had very serious consequences.
The unemployed organizations did not embrace the broad
masses and their work was unsatisfactory, so that, when
Hitler came into power, our influence in these organizations greatly declined.
.
5 ;d .Ebr these reasons the social-fascists and trade union
; ,..
bureaucrats succeeded in hindering the workers from responding to the call of the Communist Party for a mass
strike at the most acute moment for the working class.
Compared with 1924, the Communist Party of Germany
has considerably increased its influence in the working dass
during the past few years; from May 1924 to November
I . .
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1932,it doubled its vote. However, we must say in rqprd
to & m y what has already been said in regard to
other countries, vk., in Germany, also, the growing influence of the Communist Party was not consolidated. How
can the Communist Party consolidate its influence? By recruiting a section of the masses who follow the Cornmunists for the organizations which stand dose to the Communist Party, principally for the trade unions, and by
recruiting the best of them, the more advanced of them,
into the Party itself.
In Germany, as in other countries, a number of mass organizations were formed: International- Labor Defence,
Workers' International Relief, Freethinkers' Union, ExService Men's League, Friends of the Soviet Union, Red
sports organizations, unemployed organizations and trade
union opposition. What a tremendous variety! But the unfortunate thing is that the membership of all these organizations was practically the same. The broad masses of electors
who voted for us were not drawn into these organizations.
The Communists did not work sufficientlyin the mass working class organizations of the reformists and Catholics sports clubs, cultural organizations, etc.
One of the most important functions of the trade union
opposition was to work in the reformist and Catholic trade
unions. But neither in the one nor in the other was the
work adequate. This could not but lead to the fact that in
the reformist and Catholic organizations we not only failed
to fight against the Social-Democrats and the Catholic
Center, but also against the leadership of these organizations (trade union, sports, etc.).
The organizations that supported the Communist Party
did not embrace the broad masses of the workers, and in
the reformist and Catholic organizations we hardly kought
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at all against the reformists, we did not oppose our program,
our tactics, our demands to their treacherous policy. We
failed to organize the members of these organizations and
lead them,
As a result, we failed to consolidate the influence we had
acquired in the parliamentary elections before Hitler came
to power.
After being driven underground, the Party exerted colossal efforts to publish and distribute literature on all the
important questions of the revolutionary struggle. In spite
of the incredible terror, it is easier to work among the German proletariat now, because the Social-Democratic workers
and the non-party workers who supported the Social-Democrats, and also the members of the reformist unions, are in
large numbers becoming disillusioned with the policy of
Social-Democracy,
Even the German fascists are compelled to admit that
they have failed to smash up and exterminate the Communist Party of Germany. Revolutionary workers, who formerly belonged to other political trends, distribute Coinmunist literature and help the Communists in their work in
every way. The authority of the Party has grown enormously in the eyes of the broad masses. The Co~~bmunist
Party of Germany is really not only the only party of the
working class in Germany, but also the only party that is
leading the struggle f w the defense of the interests of the
working class against the fascist dictatorship. Thanks to
the changed situation in Germany and to the heroic work
of the Communist Party, the Communists no longer meet
with the resistance in the working class that was formerly
put up by the trade union bureaucrats and the SocialDemocratic Party. More than that, the young menibers
of the Social-Democratic Party are inclining towards the

Communist Party and are prepared to fight shoulder to
shoulder with the Communists against the fascist dictatorship. In this connection it is necess&y to emphasize the
extreme urgency of a determined struggle against those
Communists who desire to close the doors of the Communist Party to such workers. Cases have occurred when
Social-Democratic workers desired to join our Party, but
the Communists formed them into sympathizers' groups and
appointed commissars over them instead of drawing them
into the Party organizations and giving them work to do.
I t must be admitted, however, that the mass work of the
Cumrnuni& Party has not yet been organized on a wide
scale, there is a lack of oral, individual agitation, which is
more than ever necessary at the present time. Communist
speeqhes at fascist trade union meetings are still rare, although anti-fascist-minded workers do speak at these meetings. The fascists continue to make their demagogic declarations that. they are going to abolish unemployment, that
they. are going to provide the unemployed with work, that
they are going to improve the conditions of the workers,
etc., not in the least disturbed by the fact that apart from
the usual seasonal revival unemployment has not declined,
that unemployed relief has been reduced to the utmost extreme, and in many cases completely abolished, that wages,
nominal, and still more, real wages, have declined. In an
election speech delivered at the Skmens Works on November 10, Hitler said: "When I came into power there were
more than 6,200,000 unemployed in Germany, and now
there are only 3,710,000. If some, while not denying this,
say that our standard of living has not improved, I reply
. . . the first task was to put people back to work."
To prove in a popular manner, with facts and figures,
that the fascist dictator is lying, is very easy and at the same

time very important: it is necessary to prove that this is a
lie in such a way that every working class family, that
every employed and unemployed worker may see that it is
a lie. There is no need for me to emphasize again here how
exceptionally imwrtant it is at the present time to expose
the policy of fascism by means of .concrete illustrations, in
order to liberate the petty bourgeoisie of town and country,
and those unemployed who still believe the fascist phrases,
from fascist influence. But unfortunately, the German Communists are not doing this, or are doing it badly. The Odober issue of the illegal Rote Fahne reports that from January to July this'year, the average wage per worker declined by 214 per cent, and the total m u n t of wages paid
in this period declined by 6.3 per cent. And this is reported
in just a few lines. But these facts provide us with enormous opportunities for opening the eyes of the broad
masses of the toilers. The $hole issue should have been
devoted to this question; a number of leaflets should have
been issued on this subject, explaining in a popular manner
the real position of the working class in fascist Germany.
There are indications that the workers who are disappointd with the fascist unions are beginning to join illegal
nions. Everything must be done to enlarge the number
f illegal unions and to recruit for them the ex-members
f reformist and Catholic unions. The Communist Paity of
ermany must avoid the mistake committed by the Cornunist Party of Italy, which for five years was unable to
rganize its work in the mass, fascist, workers' organiza-'
ons. It must organize its mass work in the fascist trade
nions, in the factory sports organizations, youth organizaions and compulsory labor camps. In carrying on eneretic work in these organizations, .the Party must rally all
e discontented elements for the fight against fascism. Only
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by this, by increasing the work in the factories, and also by
improving the work in the revolutionary trade unions and
other revolutionary organizations, will ihe Communist Party
be able to &tend and consolidate its influence in the working dass.

3. Common Weaknesses of the Majority of the Sections
of the Commukst Internatwnd
What I have just said applies not only to the Communist
Party of Germany, but to the majority of the Communist
Parties in the capitalist countries. It cafl be stated quite
definitely that :
a) In many cases we carry on our agitation unskillfully,
not popularly, not correctly (Norway, Czechoslovakia, etc.) ;
our agitation does not penetrate deeply into the masses;
b) The Communist Parties have not yet learned to consolidate the influence they have already acquired.
I shall quote a few examples:
I. On International Unemployed Day, in the United
*tes,
1,225,000 workers in all the industrial centers answered the call oE the Communist Party to demonstrate. .
But the Communist Party failed to consolidate this response .
by' creating broad unemployed organizations. And what
happened? The influence of the Communist Party of the
United States soon evaporated. But even now-in spite of
the fact that after the wage cuts resulting from the recent
measures introduced by Roosevelt the American workers
are returning to the trade unions-the revolutionary trade
rmions have increased their membership to a very small
extent bnly, while the reactionary trade unions which are
affiliated to the A. F. of L. have increased their membershipvbyhdf a million.
2. LaSt year, in England, when the 10 per cent cut in
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civil servants' salaries and unemployed relief was intro-

1

-:. duced, the National ~nem~1o)ed
Workers Movement made

r
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excellent use of the discontent of the .broad masses of the
nemployed to organize huge demonstrations the like of
hich have not been seen in Efigland for a long time. But
Jai
s influence was not cofisolidated.
3
The "solidarity movement," under the leadership of the
Communist Party of Great Britain, not only organized
demonstrations,.but also took part in a number of strikes.
This "solidarity movementyyis not in itself a strong, wellilt organization, and failed to consolidate its influence.
Thus, during the past year, broad masses of the workers
in England were drawn into the struggle with the help of
the Communist Party and the organizations that follow its
d. Nevertheless, we see no material change in the attitude
the workers towards the Communist Party. The recent
unidpal elections show that although the masses of the
workers are deserting the National Laborites and the Conservatives, they are again voting for the Laborites, and
ve not yet found the road to the Communist' Party. It is
rticularly true of England that the basis of the Party can
broadened and its positions consolidated best of all by
working in all the reformist trade unions, fighting in them
for influence, fighting for the removal of the inveterate-reformist trade union bureaucrats, and for their substitution
revolutionary workers. But the Party organizations do
t yet sufficiently realize this and act accordingly.
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The Sg~ificanceof Moss Work and of Comolkiatz*fig
Acquired Influence

By improving oral agitation-individual and -group agition, but particularly individual agitation-and by carryit deeply among the broad masses, we can extend our
-
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influence. By creating our own mass organizations and by
working in the mass working dass organizations of our
opponents ( fascist, ref ormist, Catholic), tlie Communists
*
can consolidate this influence.
I said at the beginning of my speech that in this moment
of the acute intensification of the class struggle the Communist Parties, by pursuing a correct political line and with
firm revolutionary leadership, can free the broad masses
from the influence of the social-democrats, the reformict
and fascist trade unions, and other organizations, and that
they d n win the majority of the working dass only by
improving their mass work and consolidating their influence. This, in its turd, will serve as the guarantee that the
Comnjunist Parties will be able to take the lead in the decisive battles for the dictatorship of the proletariat.
In order to show to what extent the mass work of the
Communist Parties and the oonsolidation of their influence
plays a decisive role in the organization and the victory
of the revolution, it is sufficient to compare Germany in
I923 with Russia in 1 9 1 ~During
.
the revolutionary situation in Germany in 1923, the Social-Democratic Party was
in a state of complete disintegration, the trade unions lost
two-thirds of their membership. The trade' union apparatus fell to pieces because there was no money with which
to pay the officials. But at that time the Communist Party
had no mass workers' organizations, even trade unions.
The Communist Party was not sufficiently connected with
the factory committees-which played such an important
role in Berlin in 1923 (the strike against the Cuno government)-because there were no Communist nuclei in the
factories. All the various trends existing in the leadership of
the Cermilunist Party were opposed to organizing soviets.
Had not the Communists almost entirely abandoned the
80

reformist unions, they, in view of the weakness of the
trade union apparatus, could have won the majority of
the important unions. The trade unions and factory committees would then have become the mass organizations by
means of which the Party could have utilized the revolrrtionary situation in order to take power. I t is now generally well known that the leadership of the Communist
Party at that time estimated the political situation in an opportunistic manner and allowed the opportune moment for
seizing power to slip by. One of the important factors in
this was that the Party lacked driving belts connecting it
with the proletariat, etc., mass working class organizations.
The policy and practice of the Bolsheviks in Russia in
1917 was altogether different. In spite of all the, difference
there is between Russia of 1917 and Germany of 1923,
with which there is no need to deal now, it is still possible
to draw a parallel between them and to compare the Bolshevik mass work in 1917 with the helplessness of the leadership of the Communist Party of Germany in 1923 in regard to the winning of the masses.
After the February victory over 'czarism, the Bolsheviks,
everywhere, including all the industrial centers, were in
the minority in the workers' and soldiers' organizations
(factory committees, soviets, trade unions, in the company ;
regimental, brigade, army corps and front committees) ;
they did not .have a majority either in the working class or
among the soldiers. But thanks to the correct political line
they pursued, the ti;nely advancement of slogans which
mobilized the revolutionary activity of the masses, and the
broad printed and oral agitation they carried on, including
individual agitatiori in the factories, in the trade unions,
the factory committees, in the soviets, in all the sddiers'
mmittees and barracks, they, day after day, extended

jL

;,,

;.

.+ ,<

, :4

-r.

2 -'

r,

+&??

81

their influence in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, the
Mensheviks, and the socialist-revolutionaries. They consolidated this growing influence and won elected positions in all
the workers' and soldiers' organizations (members of soviets, members of executives of trade unions, of factory committees and of the various soldiers' committees). As a result of this work, the Bolsheviks, on the eve of the October Revolution, had the majority in the soviets, in the factory committees, in the trade unions and the elected soldiers' bodies. The Mensheviks and socialist-revolutionaries
still held certain positions in the central bodies, such as the
All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the All-Russian
Council of Trade Unions, the All-Russian Executive Cammittee of Railway Transport Workers' Union, and in the
front and army corps committees; but they were powerless,
as the lower organizations refused to follow their lead.
Allowing for the concrete situation in each country, the
Communist Parties must fight to win the working class
organizations in the same way as the Russian Bolsheviks
did in 1917.
I how come to the last part of my speech.
F. THE COMMUNIST PARTIES' PREPARATION FOR UNDERGROUND WORK, UTILIZATION OF LEGAL POSSIBILITIES
AND REDISTRIBUTION OF CADRES
I.

The Utilization of ad the Possibilities in the Conditions
in Which t?w Party is Working:

According to the degree and character of1 the persecution
to which they are subjected by the bourgeois state, the sections of the Communist International can be divided into
three categories, viz., more or less legal Communist Parties
(16, including the Communist Party in the Soviet regions
in China which is here legal) ; semi-legal (7) ; and corn-

pletely illegal (38). Recently the line of development has
been in the direction of the further intensification of the
dass struggle and the growth of fascism, which must affect
e position of the Communist Parties. Undoubtedly, in
1 countries the Communist Parties will be driven underound on the outbreak of war. It is difficult to forecast
the form the illegal position of this or that Communist
will assume.
countries where the Communist Parties have been
underground can be divided into two categories, Vis.,
the countries where the Communist Parties have been
driven underground, but where the mass reformist workers'
organizations continue -to exist legally (Poland, Austria.
Bulgaria,
Japan, etc.) ; and countries where all working
class organization8 and all pditical parties have been dissolved and only fascist organizations exist.
In the first category of countries the Communist Party
must use all the niass workers' organizations for the purposes of their work, such as the trade unions, cooperative
;organizations, sports organizations, workers' educational
ganizations, freethinkers' organizations and the workers'
ni+tions of all trends, such as reformist, Christian,
n all such organizations Communist fractions s h d d
organized. In these countries, efforts must be made to
the Party committees to guide the work of the Cornunist fractions, to prevent the latter from becoming isoted from the Party, to get them to carry out the Party
ine aid to get the Party committees to help them in their
rk. At the same time, the semi-legal and illegal revoluionary workers' and peasants' organizations must be
'

In the second category of countries, the C u ~ u n i s t
arties must utilize for their work all the fascist mass or-

ganizations to which workers, office employees, peasants,
young workers and women workers belong, such as trade
unions, sports and co-operative organizations, youth organizations and women's organizations. Not only is it necessary
to organize constant work in these organizations, but it is
also necessary to arrange for people to speak at meetings
called by these organizations.
The Communist Party of Germany must avoid the mistake committed by the Communist Party of Italy, and immediately commence work in the fascist organizations.
In countries like Germany and Italy, working-class mass
organizations such as trade unions, I.L.D., unemployed organizations, etc., should be formed and strengthened. Into
these organizations it is necessary to enlist those exmembers of the reformist and Catholic .trade unions and
social-democatic and Catholic parties who are willing to
fight against the fascists:
In both types of fascist countries the center of gravity
of the work must be transferred to the factories, where it
will produce the best results, of course, if it is. carried on
skillfully and energetically.

a. Cadres
a) The redistribution of forces before going under:
ground is very important. In Germany it was the middle
and lower active that suffered most in the process of transition from the legal to the illegal position. Why? Because
it was this active that came most in contact with the National-Socialists in the factories, in discussions in the districts, and finally, in open conflict with them. At the time of
the fascist coup, the first thing the ~ational-~ocialists
tried
to do was to arrest this active. In this they were assisted by
the petty-bourgeoi sieI who, after the victorv ofi the fascists

'

elections, threw themselves into the arms of the
Yational-Socialists. They pointed out where the Commug i s t s lived, who iead the Rote Fohne, etc. The Party did not
succeed in concealing the best of its active members. The
biggest arrests of Communists in all towns took place immeiately after the fascists burned the Reichstag, on the night
f February 28. It is characteristic that in spite of the fact
at the provocation against the Communist Party had developed to the utmost at that time, many of the leading Comlunists stayed at their homes that night.
Although our Party reorganized itself very quickly, it was
ot in a position to save the middle and lower active, the
preservation of which was very important for its future
work, for it was this active that maintained contacts with
the factories. Our sections must take measures to prevent
this happening again. The Parties who are in danger of
being driven underground in the near future must take measures to .prevent the middle and lower active, not to speak
of the leading active, staying at home when arrests take
place. There is nothing terrible in prematurely leaving one's
home; what is terrible is to be caught and sent to a concentration camp and thus to be prevented from doing Party
work. Comrade Pitxk, in his speech, said that even after
utlawed, many Commitnists
their homes to which 'they
ir families. And this has happened not
The more acute the class struggle becomes, the more persistently do the fascists shadow and hunt for our cadres,
and the greater is the danger that our cadres will be exb) I t is necessary to decentralize the work, both in order
o develop local initiative and to minimize the losses in the

event of arrests. Here I must say that before it went underground, the l d organizations of the German Communist
Party were shackled by an incredible centralism, a sort of
super-centralism; We have spoken about this a rrxm of
times. For example, for the sake of economy, manifestoes
' used to printed in Berlin and distributed over the whole
country without any consideration for the fact that these
manifestoes might be suitable for the center, but not for
, the districts, without any consideration for the necessity to
adapt this literature to the conditions and industries in the
districts, and to raise the questions that interest the respective category of workers at the given moment. The 1-1
organizations did not discuss any political questions until
the Central Committee had defined its attitude towards &em.
This shackled the initiative of the local Party organizations.
But, to their honor be it said, the moment they were left
without any leadership, owing to the fact that the middle
and lower Party bodies had been paralyzed by arrests for
a certain time, individual Communists and local organizations displayed remarkable initiative. As Comrade Re&
pointed out last night, the slogans issued independently by
the local organizations were later on found to coincide with
the slogans issued by the Central Committee.
This local initiative is very important. The C&mmunist
must not wait until the Party is driven underground to
remember that he is a Communist and that he must pursue
the Party line on his own responsibility. Decentralization
must be introduced at once in preparation for the transition
to an illegal position. This work is possible and necessary
in view of the growing discontent of the masses and in
view of the fact that the masses follow the lead of the
Communists if they are given concrete guidance as to how
to wage the struggle.

c ) On the other hand, decentralization is necessary for
the purpose of smecy. I n Germany a case recently occurred
in which a scoundrel, who at one time had some connection
with the Party leadership, roamed the streets of va-s
towns- in the company of fascists who were searching for
Communists, arresting them and exterminating them. The
mote decentralization is carried out, the less possible will it
be for traitors who have managed to penetrate into the
Party to damage it.
I do not know whether Comrade Ercoli mentioned in his
speech what he told us privately, that in one place only six
persons were arrested, but each of these mentioned several
other names. In this way, the secret police managed to
arrest 150 persons. Afterwards, a large number of thme
were released, and no one knew which of these was the
provocateur and which the denounced. As a result, the
whole organization was demoralized.
The d m u r n of caution must be exercised in order to
avoid arrests. I will quote another example for Germany : a
certain ex-functionary of the Party, who had gone over to
the fascists, turned up at a secret meeting place. At this
place, without any investigations being made (although n ~ t
long before that arrests had taken place in the district &is
fellow' came from), he was given the secret address af the
secretary of the Central Committee, a secretary who was
underground, and whom the fascists were looking for. By
a stroke of good fortune, the secretary was absent &'the
time, and this fellow met another comrade, who w,as
diately arrested. Direct contact with the secretary of the
Party must under no circumstances be given to un$rustworthy persons. Contact should be given only through intermediary links, and in this way the most effective safeguafds
against arrest will be created. In the case I have just men-

,

tioned the violation of the elementary principles of secrecy
was totally unjustified, because it was known at this secret
meeting place that big arrests had' take^ place in the district from which this particular functi6nary had wived.
I think it was even known that this person had actually been
arrested and later released. In fact, he had been arrested,
and when the fascists began to beat him up he went over
to their side.
In the middle of June there were further big arrests in
Germany and a number of active Party workers were
seized. Better concealment, better work is necessary! .
d) How should the Communists behave under exarnination? It is necessary to bear in mind that once an arrested
man has ' c o ~ u d c a t e dmything at all, he will not be left
in peace until he becomes a traitor. I must say that when
oar Party was underground, we issued a specid pamphlet
on how to behave under examination. If anyone in Germany is arrested and 'beaten up and he begins to talk, then
the fasdst sadists do not let him alone, but keep on beating
him until he betrays his comrades and goes over to the
fascists. The less he talks, the less the fascist executioners
will expect him to say, and the more quickly will they stop
examining him.
The popularization of the experience of the illegal work
of tho Communist Parties of Poland, Bulgaria, Germany,
Itsly, China and Japan is of enormous importance. We must
see to it that the experience in every country shall be made
known to all the Communist Parties. Individual Communists must know how to behave under examination, and
haw to avoid arrest under any given situation.
e) Ifi those countries where the Cominunist Party is
illegal, individual and group oral agitation is of enormous ,
importance (the exposure of the fascists and the Social-

Democratic Party in connection with the urgent demands
the masses, which should be linked up with the struggle
for power). This agitation should be carried on among the
broad masses and be backed by facts. In this way it will
possible to enlarge the sphere of influence of the Comunists. In this connection, the factory newspapers play
important role. There was a moment when the fascists
n Germany declared that the Communist Party had been
utterly crushed, that it no longer existed. And our comrades set themselves the task of getting Communist literature into the streets at no matter what sacrifice. The Communist Party took to distributing literature and in this way
showed that it was alive: This had enormous significance
a t that time. The foreign correspondents wrote about it to
their newspapers, and even the fascist press could not
ignore it. But this method of distributing literature must
cease now. Literature must be energetically distributed, but
this distribution must be organized 'in such a way as to
involve as few arrests as possible, and above all, it must
be organized so that the literature gets into the hands of
those for whom it is intended, i.e., the workers. It is precisely among the workers that we must distribute our literature' in the first place. I t goes without saying that the
factory newspapers play a great role in this. Special attention must be devoted to it. It is extremely important to
utilize the popularity of the factory newspapers among the
workers, to distribute them widely, to deal in them with all
the general political questions, and questions affecting the
given factory.
+ , :g,
f ) Finally, the organization of protest demonstrations:
Here, too, we must take into account whether these are
in legal or in illegal conditions. Take Austria.
When the Party there was legal and organized demonstra14
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tions, it was almost exclusively Party members who w e
out on the streets. This showed that the Party's contact
with the masses was very weak, and tEat it could not draw
the masses into the struggle. Well, one can become reconciled to demonstrations in which only Party members take
part when the Party is legal, although, of course, our task
is to organize mass demonstrations; the loss in Party cadres
involved in such exclusive demonstrations is relatively small.
It is true that the police beat up a few of the comrades,
arrested a few, but there the matter ended. But the damage
caused by such exclusive demonstrations in countries where
the Party is illegal is very much more serious.
What is now happening in Germany? Here too we organize demdnstrations, which is very important, enormously
important. But whom do we bring out onto the streets?.
Only our active. Our active is unable to bring large masses
onto the streets, and so the fascists hurl themselves upon
our members and exterminate them. Is it a good thing that
demonstrations are organized, that protests are made? Of
course it is. But it is bad that our cadres are exterminated.
We must organize protests, but they must be imposing p r e
tests, otherwise it is not worth while putting our cadres in
danger of being shot down. It would be far better if they
went to the factories and carried on agitation among the
workers. This would produce bigger results than the small
demonstrations that are now organized.
g) The skilled distribution of forces and functions is very
important, not only for legal, but also for illegal parties.
I have already had occasion to state that there are no members of the Party who could not be useful to the Party.
The question of utilizing their services is exclusively a matter of leadership, both central and local. If a Communist
is not suitable as a propagandist he can perform certain

,

technical functions; if he is not suitable as an agitator
can distribute literature, stick up posters, etc. Tbe line ire
take is as follows :if an old Party member is in the leadership, even if he is good for nothing, he h q got to be ietained. Although -he cannot carry on any mass work, is .
incapable of doing trade union work, nevertheless he is kft
in the leadership. Even if he wrecks campaign aft& campaign, he is still left on that work. Why? H e is an dd
Party member. But here and there new cadres are corning
rward who have contacts with the workers and know
to approach the workers. Very often these are nut
ized for permanent leading work in the Party organizaons or in mass workers' and peasants' organizations only
the salaried positions are occupied by old Party
s who are not able to cope with their work properly. .
P course we must treasure our old Party members: for
they have proved their loyalty to the Party, their
ess to make sacrifices for the Party. Nevertheless,
ur main criterion in approaching them should be: does
this or that old Party member properly carry out the work
he is entrusted with ? I f .he does not do that work properJy
then; although he may be an old Party member, he must be
replaced by new cadres who are able to work, who have
ontacts with the masses of the workers and are :blie to
If we have certain active workers who are able to work
rIy well, s o many duties are imposed upon them that tbep
re unable to fulfill any of them. I will read you a
nt received from the Communist Party of raw:,
A certain active member in Marles, near Calais,. ho&
he following q&es :
1 Secretary of a trade union branch. ;

LI

Secretary of the Communist Party nucleus.
3)
Secretary of the Freethinkers Socie~ybranch.
-.
4) ~ r e a s u r e rof the Freethinkers Society branch;
(Laughter.)
5) A inember of the Bureau of the Mutual Aid Society.
6) Member of the Executive of the Miners' Upion.
7) Member of the Distria Committee of the Communist
Party. (Loud bugher.)
8) Member of the bureau of the Executive Committee of
.the Miners' Union.
g) Member of the Editorial Committee of the Miners'
Union journal.
10) Member of the Auditing M t t e e of the Miners'
Federation.
1 1 ) ~ a i a ~ of
e rthe Mutual Aid Fund
r 2) Member of the ~ e t h u n eTrades Council.
13) Distributor of the newspapers L'Enckoine, La Voix
du Mineur, Def ewe, &c.
14) Dues collector (house to house) in a district other
than the one in which he lives.
15) Also does work in the "ARAC" (Ex-Servicemen's
LRague)
In addition to all these functions the comrade also fulfills
the following functions in the district where he lives :
I ) Does all the leaflet distribution.
2) Sticks up posters.
3) Collects money for special funds for the Party and
the trade union as well as other organizations.
2)

.
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"For an active member to have ten functions is quite normal in orcr M k r d Union." ( ~ e p o r tby Comrade Henri
at the Federal Bureau of the Unitary Confederation of
Labor, October 1933.)

The trouble here is not merely that this comrade cannot
fulfill all these functions, and not merely that the work must
suffer, but that the imposition of so many functions on a
single comrade prevents the promotion of new cadres. If
a single comrade badly fulfills sixteen functions, they could
be well fulfilled by sixteen comrades if they were utilized
for this work. We ourselves shout about the inadvisability
of imposing many functions on a single comrade, but we
do not improve the distribution of work, we make no progress in this matter. This is harmful. This retards the
creation of cadres. We must declare war on such a method
of distributing the work. Every single Party member must
be utilized and be given the opportunity to show what work
he can do.

IV. Conclusion
The reformists and the social-democrats could not retain
their positions in the working class if they had not behind
them the bourgeoisie and its state. But from this it only
follows that the agitation and organizational work of the
Communist Patties and the revolutionary trade unions
among the masses must be incomparably better than that
carried qn by the reformists.
Unfortunately, this is fax from being the case.
The reformists give answers to the workers on all the
urgent questions; of course, they give answers which correspond to their muin aim, viz, to serve the bourgeoisie and to
betray the proletariat.
The Communists can successfully expose the SocialDemocratic Party and the reformists only if, to counteract
the reformists, they, in a timely and revolutionary manner,
respond to all the urgent needs of the broad masses of the
workers on questions of wages, the working day, unemployment insurance in all its forms, labor legislation, capitalist
rationalization, etc., and at the same time, link all these
questions up with the home and foreign politics of the
country and with the preparation of the masses for the
decisive struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat.
At the time of the first round of wars and revolutions no
definitely formed monolithic Communist Parties as yet
existed. Owing to this, the social-democrats and reformist
trade unions managed to keep the revolution under their
influence, to betray and smash up the vanguard of the
working class. Today, Communist Parties exist, and their
main and urgent task is to win the majority of the working
class and guarantee the victory of the revolution. For this

purpose the Communist Parties and the revolutionary trade
movement must first of all expose the defects in their
own work and remove them as quickly as possible in order
to prevent the d d e r n o c r a t s and the reformist trade
union bureaucrats from betraying the working class again
by leading them to be massacred in the interests of the
bourgeoisie in time of war, and by saving capitalism from
the victorious proletarian revolution in time of revolution.
Prolonged applause.)
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